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4Foreword
As it enters its sixth year of prolonged economic crisis, the European Union (EU) stands at a 
crossroads. The sluggish economic growth observed in most Member States, combined with grow-
ing economic imbalances between northern and southern Europe and widening social inequali-
ties driven by high unemployment have cast doubt on the EU’s ability to achieve its vision of 
establishing a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy. It is unclear whether European leaders 
can take the steps needed to strengthen European integration or if populist and anti-EU parties 
will continue to gain traction and potentially derail the European project. The upcoming European 
Parliament elections offer EU citizens for the first time a clear choice regarding the future design 
of the EU by giving them a say in who will become the European Commission’s next president. 
Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, European integration has targeted the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and workers across the borders of the Treaty’s signatories. While the idea of the 
European Community originated in the desire to foster peace throughout a war-weary western 
Europe, the instruments designed to achieve this goal were economic in nature. Creating a Com-
mon Market was intended to bring about economic prosperity for all Community members by 
building and strengthening the economic ties between them. Guaranteeing the right to live, work 
and study anywhere in its territory through the freedom of movement of people is at the heart of 
the EU project and is most closely associated with EU citizenship. 
The free movement of citizens is a principal cornerstone of the European Union and one of its key 
success stories. A recent Eurobarometer survey shows Europeans consider free movement to be 
the EU’s most significant achievement, ahead of peace in Europe and the single currency. Today, 
more than 14 million EU citizens are resident in another Member State and take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by this right. In addition, more than two-thirds of Eurobarometer respon-
dents believe the free movement of people also yields benefits for their home country’s economy. 
However, intra-EU migration and mobility have periodically sparked fierce debates about (poten-
tial) “mass migration” and stirred fears of “welfare tourism” in destination countries. Most recently, 
these concerns have been raised when transitional arrangements restricting the free movement of 
Bulgarian and Romanian citizens were lifted on 1 January 2014. Although these claims are based 
less on solid fact or economic reality than on emotions, they nevertheless have a profound impact 
on public perception. All too often, calls to restrict the freedom of movement of certain groups or 
nationals question the aims and purpose of a common European labour market as such. 
This debate is emerging at a time when the need for increased intra-EU labour mobility is more 
urgent than ever. While some Member States grapple with outrageously high youth unemploy-
ment rates and others face skill and labour shortages, and as gaps in growth and competitiveness 
increase within the EU, labour mobility can function as an important adjustment mechanism in 
helping the EU achieve inclusive growth. In other words, the free movement of people is not the 
problem; it is one of the solutions to the challenges we currently face.
Foreword
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In contributing to this solution, the Bertelsmann Stiftung has initiated the Harnessing European 
Labour Mobility (HELM) project involving a group of leading experts on European mobility and 
migration issues. The study presented here offers our findings and recommendations. By advanc-
ing a set of concrete policy recommendations, the Bertelsmann Stiftung aims to inject new life into 
the debate about what the EU and individual Member States can do in order to facilitate intra-EU 
labour mobility and maximise its potential for growth and employment. 
When framed in terms of a solution rather than a problem, the free movement of people can be 
a function of a more competitive, inclusive and prosperous EU. Labour mobility can help ease 
the burden of high unemployment in southern Europe as it provides people the opportunity to 
improve their material and social status by seeking work abroad. At the same time, it helps fill 
job vacancies where they are needed most and expands the pool of talent available to employers. 
Overall, labour mobility can increase productivity by efficiently matching skills and jobs, and it 
can strengthen the innovative capacity of European firms as more individuals share their knowl-
edge and competencies.
Most importantly, however, the growing interaction and movement of people between countries 
will help European societies grow together and develop a shared European identity. A shared 
identity and sense of solidarity not only prepare Europe for further integration but provide it a 
vital antidote to the threat of nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments. By growing closer, the EU 
will become more open and attractive to migrants from third countries. Ultimately, increased 
immigration from beyond the European Union’s borders is the key to the EU tackling its long-term 
demographic and economic challenges in the context of globalisation.
By promoting a “Fair Deal on Talent” the Bertelsmann Stiftung has established international labour 
migration and mobility as one of its key areas of focus for the coming years. Our work in this area 
will advance the discussions of this study and bring it to the international level. The EU will soon 
have to develop a strategy on how best to combine policies for employment, intra-EU mobility and 
immigration in order to secure a skilled and mobile workforce and a better future for us all.
Aart De Geus
CEO and Chairman,  
Bertelsmann Stiftung
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Unemployment is high and increasingly persistent in most Member States. Imbalances in growth 
and competitiveness across countries, as well as structural skill mismatches on EU labour mar-
kets have been growing since the crisis. In this context, increased cross-border labour mobility 
within the EU can have important benefits both for individual citizens and the aggregate economy. 
Labour mobility allows workers to escape unemployment or find a better job, helps employers fill 
labour and skill shortages, and generally increases the efficiency of labour markets. In addition, 
intra-EU mobility fosters and reinforces the idea of European integration and helps the European 
Union fulfil its vision of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
However, despite a certain increase observed in the context of eastern enlargement after 2004, 
intra-EU labour mobility remains low in Europe in particular when compared to other regions of 
the world. Although a favourable legal framework for mobility has been established, mobile citi-
zens still face a wide range of problems and obstacles that hamper cross-border labour mobility. 
Also, there is considerable scope to make existing labour mobility more efficient and beneficial 
for all parties involved. 
To help foster intra-EU mobility, the Harnessing European Labour Mobility (HELM) study presents 
16 prioritised policy recommendations for the European Union, national governments, and other 
actors in the labour market. These policy recommendations were assessed and tested through a 
scenario analysis seeking to identify drivers and challenges for labour mobility in 2025. Through 
the input of a multi-disciplinary and pan-European advisory board, five scenarios for the future of 
EU labour mobility were developed. These scenarios provide a 360 degree analysis of the political, 
economic, social, cultural and technological factors that could impact labour mobility in Europe.
The scenario analysis sought to answer the following three questions:
 Which uncertainties could have a high impact on labour mobility?
 How could/should labour mobility look in 2025?
 What are the most critical policy recommendations to foster intra-EU labour mobility? 
The five scenarios are:
 Polarised Europe
 Marketised Europe
 Regulated Europe
 Fragmented Europe
 Paralysed Europe
Executive summary
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of economic prospects and institutional developments. Given that future economic and political 
trends will heavily affect EU labour mobility, the scenario method allows us to arrive at robust 
policy recommendations without pre-empting political decisions about the future of European 
integration. Policy recommendations have been assessed as to whether they are essential, addi-
tional or scenario-dependent. Essential policy recommendations are the most robust proposals, 
as they are recommended across all possible scenarios. Additional policy recommendations can 
support labour mobility to a certain extent, while scenario-dependent policy recommendations are 
only valuable under certain conditions.
 
Essential policy recommendations 
 Invest in training and up-skilling of mobile workers by strengthening the mobility dimension 
of the European Social Fund.
 Improve European-wide job matching by further developing EURES into a true EU-wide job 
portal which is attractive for employers and workers alike.
 Finish and simplify coordination of social security systems by closing remaining legal gaps 
in the area of unemployment and long-term care benefits as well as by making social-security 
coordination more transparent and accessible for citizens.
 Encourage return migration through targeted policies in sending countries to facilitate return 
and professional re-integration.
 Promote free movement and oppose nationalism by emphasising the benefits of mobility, 
improving monitoring of mobility flows as well as engaging stakeholders in a campaign for 
labour mobility.
Additional policy recommendations
 Invest in infrastructure projects for mobility in order to allow easy and affordable transporta-
tion across borders for commuters.
 Support mobility-oriented mindsets by continually investing in language training and opportu-
nities for intercultural experiences for students and youth.
 Promote and simplify the recognition of professional qualifications as well as skills and compe-
tences acquired through non-formal and informal learning by developing speedy, cost-effective 
and simple procedures and frameworks for recognition and assessment.
 Address the integration needs of mobile workers and their families by proactively including 
them in integration measures such as language and orientation courses.
 Help localities deal with social burdens created by mobility by dedicating parts of EU structural 
and cohesion funds to the uneven territorial effects of mobility.
 Make national labour markets more flexible and fight discrimination based on citizenship by 
flexicurity-type labour market reforms and stronger enforcement of free movement rights.
Executive summary
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needy job-seekers who take up employment in another country.
 Foster a European fair deal on talent by establishing a mechanism to compensate talent-sending 
countries for their investments in mobile workers’ education and training.
Scenario-dependent recommendations are: 
 Develop a European minimum wage and working conditions policy in order to better protect 
mobile and posted workers from exploitation.
 Sustain support for free movement by limiting opportunities for fraud and abuse.
 Support initiatives to foster mobility at a regional and bilateral level by establishing a European 
platform for sharing best practices in the area of cross-border recruitment processes.
Overview of scenarios
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Polarised Europe
It is 2025, and with very few exceptions, economic development in Europe has been sluggish since 2008. 
Already existing periphery-core migration patterns have become more pronounced. Lower-than-average 
growth rates in more remote parts of Europe drive Europeans in those regions to seek opportunities 
elsewhere. 
Intra-EU mobility is driven by need rather than opportunity and is greatest among medium and low-
skilled workers, who move from poorer to richer Member States. Economic and social polarisation is 
increasing, creating social and political tensions across Europe.
Marketised Europe
Following the debt crises and recessions in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the 
European project has emerged strengthened. Driven by a concerted effort to remove regulations and cut 
spending, austerity policies have strengthened the Union’s credibility.
Due to global competition, technological development and deregulation, there is greater variety in the 
types of employment and the distribution of earnings. A subsection of European workers has become 
nomadic, moving from country to country in search of work.
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Regulated Europe
The economic downturn that started in 2008 taught European leaders an important lesson: European 
prosperity could only be achieved via deeper political integration and furthering the EU project with the 
hope that economic growth would follow, as it ultimately did.
As part of the plan to achieve this goal, European leaders strive to increase the flexibility and mobility 
of EU citizens. For the last decade, EU Member States have worked to lay the foundations for a com-
mon labour market as well as to strengthen the single currency and other EU institutions. Mobility has 
become more circular and less permanent, and is based on such pull factors as skill needs and individual 
career development.
Fragmented Europe
The European project is a shambles. Less competitive countries have left the euro zone as they can 
no longer bear the costs of staying inside the framework. The EU is no longer an attractive partner for 
countries that once considered themselves prospective members. The EU’s economic competitiveness 
continues to decline. Member States struggle to maintain their welfare services in the face of creditor 
pressure for drastic cuts and increased austerity. 
As a result, EU citizens’ optimism is at an all-time low. Instead of moving to other EU countries, EU 
talents often choose to migrate to other, more dynamic regions. The level of intra-EU mobility is very 
low. It is better to stick with the accustomed security and benefits rather than risk an uncertain future 
in another part of Europe.
Paralysed Europe
In a hasty attempt to overcome the crisis, EU leaders relentlessly push for pervasive political integration 
for much of the 2010s. They see political integration as a panacea that would lead Europe out of its 
slump. In 2025, Europeans have become aware that this political integration has exacerbated existing 
structural problems rather than ameliorating them. 
The need for structural reforms is paramount, but the European Union and its members adopted a rigid 
and rule-based approach to regulations. This rigidity prevents taking action. Although it is now easier to 
move around Europe, few do so.  Instead of moving to other EU countries, mobile EU workers choose to 
migrate to other, more dynamic economies in Latin America, Asia, and North America.
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Labour markets in Europe are facing enormous challenges. With the exception of only a few 
countries, the financial crisis, economic downturn and soaring public debt have contributed to 
sharply increasing unemployment rates. In some cases, pre-crisis levels doubled or even tripled. 
A considerable proportion of the rise in unemployment is attributed to the direct effects of the 
cyclical downturn. It can be expected that economic recovery will eventually do away with this 
type of joblessness. At the beginning of 2014, labour markets in southern European countries are 
beginning to show the first signs of this development.
However, the crisis in Europe has also exposed severe structural deficits in many labour markets 
that exacerbate gaps between labour demand and supply. The European Commission estimates 
that half of the increase in the European Union’s unemployment rate from 2007 to 2012 can 
be attributed to a rise in structural unemployment. Member States most affected by the crisis 
in general have experienced an even steeper build-up of structural unemployment. This type of 
joblessness is typically persistent and will not easily vanish during the next economic upswing. 
Mismatches in the labour market are key drivers of structural unemployment. They occur when the 
supply of skills, knowledge and competencies among workers does not meet companies’ demand 
and vice versa. These gaps are detrimental to both parties engaged in the labour market. Workers 
suffer because they are unable to gainfully employ their skills and competencies. Companies, on 
the other hand, cannot find employees with the skills required to maintain or expand produc-
tion. This applies even during economic downturns as substantial turnover typically continues. In 
addition, public finances and social security systems miss out on taxes and contributions which, 
in turn, frustrate the capacity of automatic stabilisers and anti-cyclical policies to take effect. 
Minimising mismatches in the labour market is clearly a win-win-strategy. 
There are various approaches to minimising mismatches. One such approach and the focus of this 
study – improving physical cross-border labour mobility – offers potential benefits that deserve 
attention. First, despite the increases in intra-EU mobility observed in the context of enlargement, 
transnational mobility remains relatively low in Europe especially when compared to other regions 
of the world. In addition, although a favourable legal framework for mobility has been established 
for the European Union (EU), finding work and relocating to another EU country presents work-
ers with considerable challenges that do not usually exist when moving within their country’s 
national borders. Finally, structural unemployment in the EU, and labour market mismatches in 
particular, today have a strong cross-national dimension. While high unemployment rates and 
bleak employment prospects continue in some countries, companies elsewhere find it difficult to 
fill their vacancies. This phenomenon, observed for quite some time now, has been aggravated 
by the crisis. In 2007, the range between the lowest and highest unemployment rates in EU-27 
amounted to 7.6 percentage points. By 2013, this gap soared to 22 percentage points. While 
Introduction – the case for Harnessing European Labour Mobility
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labour supply exceeds demand by a large margin in countries hit hard by the crisis, other Member 
States have fared considerably better. In fact, some of them have been facing labour shortages, not 
only in highly skilled professions but, increasingly, in medium or even lower-skilled occupations. 
The economic rationale for increased cross-border labour mobility is quite simple: The most effi-
cient use of resources can be achieved when factors of production are employed in those places 
where they provide the highest-possible added value. Furthermore, leaving workers unemployed, 
under-employed or in jobs where they are unable to fully tap their potential is a waste of resources. 
By being geographically mobile, workers can escape unemployment, achieve a better job match 
and thereby improve their economic well-being. At the same time, firms are able to fill vacan-
cies, find the candidates with the most suitable skill-sets and increase production. In sum, labour 
mobility increases aggregate productivity, and it enhances economic growth and welfare.
It is well known that workers’ ability to freely relocate becomes even more important in a mon-
etary union. When currency devaluations intended to improve competitiveness and reduce unem-
ployment are no longer an option, adjustments in the volume of labour supply become a key factor 
in targeting labour market equilibrium. While labour mobility will hardly compensate entirely for 
currency devaluations, it certainly can play a role in a concerted range of adjustment mechanisms. 
In addition to these efficiency considerations, cross-border labour mobility can have further eco-
nomic benefits for both sending and receiving countries. In sending countries, benefits include a 
decline in unemployment rates, lower spending on social benefits, extra capital inflows through 
remittances as well as an improved human capital base in case of return. For receiving countries, 
advantages include positive fiscal and labour market effects, a stabilisation of social security sys-
tems and an inflow of human capital increasing the long-term growth potential of the economy. 
Apart from purely economic considerations, labour mobility offers several other very solid benefits 
for individuals and the European Union alike. From a personal perspective, going abroad delivers 
individuals new personal, cultural and professional experiences. Going abroad and interacting with 
people from other nationalities at the workplace and in private life improves mutual understanding, 
brings European peoples closer together and ultimately promotes the idea of a unified Europe. 
Intra-EU labour mobility can take various forms, both regarding its legal context and the specific 
mobility pattern. Permanent relocation to another country is just one option among many, includ-
ing daily or weekly commutes across borders by so-called frontier workers or (repeated) periods 
abroad for shorter amounts of time. Legally, the bulk of labour mobility within the EU takes place 
under the freedom of movement of workers which guarantees EU citizens the right to look for a 
job and work in another Member State. This also affords EU citizens the right to equal treatment 
in accessing employment, working conditions and all other social and tax advantages. Moreover, 
intra-EU mobility is also affected by the Service Directive. In particular, self-employed persons 
or posted workers may sell their services (temporarily) in another EU Member State through a 
company (of their own) or a placement agency that is established in another Member State.
Introduction – the case for Harnessing European Labour Mobility
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Acknowledging the various benefits associated with mobility, it is quite surprising that actual 
mobility within the EU is fairly low. In the two-year period up to 2012, among the more than 500 
million inhabitants of the European Union, only 650,000 persons moved to work in another Mem-
ber State (no data was available for Belgium). This figure points to considerably subdued worker 
mobility when compared to the two-year period up to 2008, just before the onset of the crisis. Back 
then, approximately 900,000 economically active persons moved cross-border in order to work. 
Labour mobility needs to increase by almost 40% in order to return to pre-crisis levels. Looking 
at the total stock of EU citizens working in another Member State, this indicator amounted to 6.6 
million in 2012, which equaled a mere 3% of the labour force (EU Comm 2013). European labour 
mobility is also quite low when compared to large countries with a federal structure in other parts 
of the world. For instance, the OECD has calculated that, in 2010, inter-regional mobility within 
the EU-15 Member States averaged to 1% of the total population, and cross-border mobility to 
0.35%. In contrast, the figures for the United States, Australia and Canada were 2.4, 1.5 and 1.0%, 
respectively (OECD 2012). Comparisons between the United States and the EU-27 regarding inter-
regional mobility for the year 2008 yield a figure of 2.8% for the former and 1.03% for the latter 
(Gáková and Dijkstra 2010). 
Especially in view of sharply increasing employment prospect disparities due to the crisis, this 
low degree of mobility, at first sight, comes as a surprise. However, notwithstanding the important 
legal acquis in the area of free movement, mobile citzens still face a wide range of problems and 
obstacles when looking for jobs and working in another country. In many respects, a common 
European Labour market still remains a political vision to be realised. First of all, being mobile 
comes at a personal cost; this involves not only the direct costs of moving, but also – and in many 
cases much more importantly – the psychological and social costs of leaving family and friends 
behind. While these costs can hardly be addressed by political action, there is a series of fac-
tors that policies can address in order to facilitate mobility and support workers willing to move. 
These range from creating economic incentives, providing information, lowering bureaucratic and 
administrative hurdles, coordinating national policies to measures aimed at fostering a mobility 
friendly culture.
The aim of this study is to develop sufficiently concrete and robust policy recommendations on 
how to harness European labour mobility. In order to achieve this task, it takes a unique point of 
departure: the assessment of possible scenarios of labour mobility in the year 2025. The future 
of labour mobility – its volume, structure and benefits for the individuals, companies, Member 
States and the European Union – heavily depends on existing trends as well as future economic 
and political developments. Acknowledging that, future developments will also have an impact on 
the selection of appropriate policies in order to foster and improve labour mobility over the next 
10 years. It is impossible to provide serious, precise predictions about all the influential factors 
that gear future mobility towards one direction or another. However, it is possible to develop 
imaginable scenarios for the future of labour mobility. By engaging in such a “what if” exercise, we 
manage to derive our recommendations without pre-empting an unpredictable future. 
Introduction – the case for Harnessing European Labour Mobility
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Using the scenario method enables us to:
 conduct a 360 degree analysis of the political, economic and social factors affecting relevant 
cultural and technological issues that could impact labour mobility in Europe; 
 explore which policy interventions are necessary to move towards a specific scenario where 
mobility takes a desirable form;
 assess what policy interventions are necessary to improve mobility within a given scenario 
regardless of the desirability of that scenario;
 prioritise policy recommendations for the European Union and national governments as well 
as other actors in the labour market.
This study focuses exclusivly on issues related to EU citizens’ mobility inside the European Union. 
Of course, this choice is to some extent arbitrary as third-country nationals, coming to the EU 
or moving between Member States, represent an important share of the EU workforce. Also, EU 
citizens have the scope to move to countries outside the EU. Yet, while these international mobility 
flows are important, they raise further issues, such as regulations covering admission, residence 
and work permits – in general the steering and controlling of migration – which are beyond the 
scope of this study.
Harnessing European labour mobility first of all requires an increase of labour movements across 
borders in volume and frequency. But of course, we provide ideas on how to enable workers to be 
mobile if they deem it desirable for personal reasons, not to force them in order to achieve some 
abstract economic goal. It is about increasing the options, not the obligations. Second, policies 
to promote and support mobility should also aim at making labour mobility more efficient and 
maximise its benefits for all parties involved. While there is a broad consensus among researchers 
that labour mobility within the EU overall benefits the economies of both sending and receiving 
countries, as well as the individual mobile worker, there can be negative externalities such as 
a brain drain in sending countries or pressures on local labour markets in receiving countries. 
When implementing policies to increase labour mobility, policymakers have to pay attention to 
the potentially uneven distribution of benefits and burdens among different groups and consider 
taking steps to mitigate possible negative side effects. 
Scenario-building and developing policy recommendations cannot be done without the expertise 
of long-time specialists in this area. This study has been created drawing from the invaluable input 
from a multi-stakeholder, multi-disciplinary advisory board by capturing the various, sometimes 
contrasting, more often complementary perspectives on labour mobility within the European 
Union. A full list of all the people involved in this study can be found at the end of this publication.
14
Introduction – the case for Harnessing European Labour Mobility
The need for labour mobility in the EU: The Europe 2020 perspective
Martin Ahbe, Secretariat General of the European Commission
Europe 2020 is the European Union’s 10-year growth strategy. It is about more than just overcoming 
the crisis which continues to afflict many of our economies, however; Europe 2020 addresses the short-
comings of the EU’s growth model and aims to create conditions for a different type of growth that is 
smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive.
Before the current crisis, the EU and most Member States displayed an increasingly efficient job-
matching process, with both unemployment and job vacancy rates decreasing. Over the last two years, 
however, this trend has changed. This change reflects mismatches in terms of skills, regions and sectors. 
Labour mobility – both geographical and occupational – is seen as one way of tackling the underlying 
mismatches.
According to the 2013 Annual Growth Survey there is an urgent need to “tap the job potential of 
expanding sectors, such as the green economy, healthcare and information and communications tech-
nology, through a future-oriented and reliable legal framework, the development of adequate skills and 
targeted public support”, with the 2014 Annual Growth Survey additionally identifying corresponding 
measures “to support job creation in fast-growing sectors and to facilitate labour mobility” as priorities. 
Looking at EU Member States individually and comparing data pre-crisis, the picture is by no means 
homogeneous:
 For most Member States, despite a higher level of job vacancies, unemployment rates are rising 
slightly. In some cases, much higher levels of job vacancies are associated with higher levels of 
unemployment (Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia). 
 There is a group of Member States with labour shortage indicators that remain at a comparatively 
low level, but with increased unemployment rates (Italy, Denmark, Slovenia and Poland). In Portugal, 
Spain and Cyprus, unemployment is increasing with a lower number of job vacancies.
 Only in Germany is there a reduction of unemployment levels combined with a lower level of job 
vacancies. With several Member States, however, the reduction of unemployment is in line with an 
increase in job vacancies (Malta and Austria), indicating potential labour shortages.
Further reading
EU Comm. n.d. “Skills Mismatches and Labour Mobility.” 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/27_skills_gaps_and_labour_mobility.pdf.
15
History of labour mobility in Europe
History of labour mobility in Europe
Mikkel Barslund and Matthias Busse, Centre for European Policy Studies
The following chapter is devoted to mobility trends in the EU and takes a historical perspective in 
order to contrast recent developments. While a general overview may prove useful when compar-
ing EU mobility with, for example, mobility in the United States, the real story lies in bilateral flows. 
Naturally, displaying all bilateral flows is neither necessary nor appropriate to the scope of this 
chapter. As a result, groups of countries were chosen, such as the new member states (EU-8), older 
member states (EU-15) and Bulgaria plus Romania. Since the crisis, south-north labour migration 
has received particular attention, with flows from Spain to Germany dominating the overall trends. 
Hence, a more detailed analysis of some countries has been conducted owing to their weight in 
current flows. In some cases where a variety of countries are depicted, certain countries had to be 
excluded since the absence of data precluded us from advancing a reliable estimate.
Historical episodes of large-scale mobility within Europe 
The movement or mobility of people has a long tradition in European history. Indeed, one of the 
most intense eras of shifting populations was the so-called Migration Period (Völkerwanderung) 
from 400 to 800 AD during which primarily Germanic peoples moved south and westwards, push-
ing towards the frontiers of the Roman Empire. 
 
Other notable waves of intra-European migration took place during the decades spanning the late 
19th and early 20th centuries as nation-states throughout Europe began to establish themselves. 
These early waves of migration were characterised less by labour mobility and the search for job 
opportunities than by individuals’ responses to domestic events such as revolutions or bloody 
shifts in power that made life untenable for certain population groups in a given region. Push 
factors of this nature were the main determinants in decisions to move (Bade 2003).
 
In the 20th century, during the period between the two world wars, Europe began to witness cases 
of large-scale labour mobility. For example, during the 1920s and 1930s, Belgium recruited nearly 
200,000 primarily Polish and Italian workers and families to fill its demand for labour in heavy 
industries such as coal. 
While World War II brought a temporary end to this development, after the war, Belgium resumed 
its programme of bilateral recruitment agreements first with Italy and later with Spain, Greece 
and other states beyond Europe. German bilateral agreements to recruit industry workers in the 
same countries were initiated somewhat later in 1955 (Petrovic 2012). While pull factors stem-
ming from employment opportunities in Western Europe were important, there were also signifi-
cant push factors at play. Life under dictatorships in Greece and Spain likely played a role, as did 
severe economic hardship in certain regions of the sending countries.
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The volume of these movements was important from the perspective of sending countries. An esti-
mated 10% of the Greek population left Greece during the period from 1955 to 1973, when Greek 
democracy was restored (Karakatsanis and Swarts 2003). Portuguese emigration from 1950 until 
1988 amounted to almost 1.4 million legal departures (equal to 12% of the population). These indi-
viduals left primarily for Portugal’s former colony Brazil and the two classical destinations, the 
United States and Canada, but also France and Germany. These five receiving countries accounted 
for 82% of total Portuguese emigrants (Baganha 1998). Spanish migrants left for similar destina-
tions. From the 1960s until the early 1970s, on average 100,000 workers sought employment in 
France, Germany and Switzerland. These three combined received 93% of Spanish emigrants in 
Europe over the period of 1962 to 1970 (Bover and Velilla 1999).
In the 1960s, northwestern European economies were booming while southern Europe economies 
stagnated. The situation then of western Germany vis-à-vis Spain parallels that found today. With 
nearly one-quarter of workers in today’s Spain unemployed, few workers there hope to find a job 
in the short term. By contrast, some areas of Germany face shortages in certain economic sectors, 
and the labour market conditions in these areas are generally very favourable. However, the mobil-
ity response in the 1960s which saw thousands of Spaniards moving to Germany in order to work 
in industry, is very different from that observed in recent years (Figure 1). 
The migration of Spanish workers to Germany peaked in the 1960s and continued until the early 
1970s when the first oil price shock brought economic expansion in Germany to an abrupt halt. 
Each rise or drop in immigration was followed by a corresponding rise or drop in emigration one 
or two years later. This indicates that most Spanish migration was temporary in nature. Even 
after the wave of Spanish immigration to Germany ceased, return migration to Spain continued 
for another five years until most of Germany’s Spanish guest workers had returned to their home 
country. The rise in Spanish immigration to Germany seen today is nowhere near comparable to 
the vast migration flows of the past. Given the considerably smaller size of the Spanish population 
in the 1960s, today’s flows are vastly less significant. 
Freedom of movement is now one of the defining principles of the European Community. Nonethe-
less, in the early days of the EC, fears ran high in France and Germany of an unmanaged influx of 
workers from much poorer Italy in the absence of any restrictions. Only with the Council Regula-
tion of 1968 was there a breakthrough in ensuring freedom of movement as well as the equal 
treatment of workers. Given that the European Economic Community (EEC) consisted then of only 
six countries (the six original signatories to the 1957 Treaty of Rome), the Council Regulation had 
limited impact, with the exception of issues regarding Italians working in Belgium, France and 
Germany (Stöckel 2007).
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The economic crisis of the 1970s constrained employment opportunities in most countries and 
diminished the scope of opportunities for those seeking work outside their native country. When 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973, the mobility of workers was 
not a significant theme in the enlargement process. Whereas Denmark and the United Kingdom 
were on average wealthier, as measured by GDP per capita, than the six founding countries, 
Ireland was too small to provoke fears of the mass migration of poor and unemployed workers. 
However, further steps taken in enlargement, with Greece joining the EEC in 1981, and Spain 
and Portugal in 1986, involved a respective six- and seven-year transition period before the free 
movement of workers without restrictions was completed. Neither during nor after each transition 
period did Europe see much in the way of labour mobility. No transition period was implemented 
for the 1995 enlargement with Austria, Finland and Sweden (Stöckel 2007).
In 1992 the issue of labour mobility was turned upside down when the Commission began to 
address concerns regarding the low level of labour mobility within Europe. This led to the creation 
of the European Employment Services (EURES) system of cooperation among national employ-
ment services as a means of sharing information about vacancies and work opportunities within 
the EU (Council Regulation 2434/92).
Figure 1: Spanish immigration to Germany and return migration to Spain, 1960–2012
Number of persons
Circular 
migration
Source: Instituto Federal de Estadística 2013.
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Concerns regarding labour mobility grew as Europe prepared to form its currency union, realised 
with the introduction of the euro in 2002. At the time, low labour mobility was considered to be 
one of the strongest barriers to a well-functioning currency union. In contexts where monetary 
policy is no longer under sovereign control and the impact of fiscal policy can in times of crisis be 
limited, the ability of workers to relocate from regions or countries with low employment prospects 
to countries with more favourable labour markets plays a key role in fostering competitiveness. 
A look at the stocks of EU-15 immigrants and emigrants suggests that past mobility has rarely 
resulted in permanent relocation (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Emigrant stocks for the EU-15, within EU-15 countries and outside 
 (2006 for expatriates within EU-15, 2008 for expatriates outside EU-15).
as % of population
Souce: Eurostat data and DIOC database (OECD).
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In the years before the global financial crisis, Portugal and Ireland sent considerably more intra-
EU migrants than did the other EU-15 Member States. In the case of Portugal, a large share of 
its expatriates resided in Spain, whereas a large share of Ireland’s expatriates went to the United 
Kingdom during this period. Among the remaining 13 Member States, the expatriate percentage 
relative to the national population was just below 2%. Among the five Member States with the larg-
est population, only Italy recorded an expatriate percentage above 2% during this period, whereas 
the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Germany recorded slightly more than 1%. The percentage 
of expatriates is generally higher in those countries with smaller populations.
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Why do people move? Reasons for being mobile 
Merja Kauhanen, Labour Institute for Economic Research
Migration literature postulates several factors that can influence a decision to migrate internationally. As 
regards theoretical work on determinants, there is no single theory. The models explaining international 
migration can be classified as micro-level, meso-level and macro-level (Hagen-Zanker 2008). Micro-level 
models focus on individual behaviour and decisions to migrate; meso-level models deal with a household 
or community level; and macro-level models address aggregate level or country-level opportunity factors.
Although there is no single theory for why people choose to be mobile, there has been a strong emphasis 
on economic explanations in theoretical work. The human capital investment model of migration devel-
oped by Sjaastad (1962) suggests that migration is an individual investment decision to increase the 
productivity of human capital. An individual migrates if the expected benefits of migration (e.g., increased 
earnings, chances of getting a job, career possibilities) exceed the migration costs (e.g., travel costs, wage 
income lost while looking for a new job, costs due to adapting to a new country, psychological costs). The 
extensions of this human capital investment approach do not only explain why people migrate but also 
the selectivity of migrants. Depending on individual characteristics, cost-benefit calculations can result in 
different outcomes with respect to migration decisions and also the choice of a host country (EU Comm 
2000). The new economics of labour migration (NELM) suggests that migration decisions are made by 
families or households and not by individuals; and that the household essentially maximises joint income 
and status while minimising risks (Stark and Bloom 1985). All these factors affect the migration decisions 
of the household. Macro-level theories suggest a number of socio-economic determinants surrounding 
a decision to migrate (Eurofound 2007). These determinants include the current labour market situation, 
such as available job opportunities, or too low earnings in the home country. Instead of these kinds of 
push factors, Piore (1979) explains international migration by pull factors in receiving countries such as 
a permanent demand for foreign workers. In addition to pure economic determinants, there are many 
other reasons for being mobile, including social (such as marriage migration or joining family members), 
political, cultural and psychological rationales that have received increasing attention in the literature. 
It has also been acknowledged that studying the economics of immigration demands a broader and 
interdisciplinary approach (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2013).
Also the empirical evidence concerning international migration indicates that migrants have a variety 
of reasons for migrating or moving. For example, regarding intra-EU mobility, the literature (Eurofound 
2007; Bonin et al. 2008) has detected labour market-related factors such as higher wages, opportunities 
to find a suitable job, and better working conditions as main determinants for east-west migration 
flows. But also family and network-related factors, as well as housing and local environment factors, 
play a role in migration decisions within the EU (Eurofound 2006). There is also evidence that individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, education level or past migration experience have an impact on an 
individual’s propensity to be mobile.
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Pre-crisis mobility in the EU-15
After the introduction of the euro in 2002 and until the impact of the financial crisis 2008, intra-
EU mobility remained low among the EU-15 Member States in comparison with the United States 
or Australia (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Intra-EU-15 mobility, 2002–2011
% of EU-15 population
Source: Eurostat, OECD and Holland et al., 2011.
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From 2002 to 2011, an approximate one out of every 1,000 EU-15 citizens moved from one coun-
try to another within the EU each year. This mobility rate is radically lower than that found in 
the United States where, on average, 25 out of every 1,000 citizens move to a different state 
each year, and that observed in Australia, where 15 for every 1,000 citizens move (OECD 2012). 
While comparative data at the EU level is incomplete (data for Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal is missing), the available evidence suggests that prior to the crisis, the composition 
of intra-EU-15 mobility remained roughly constant among the Member States. The most notable 
changes involved an increase of immigration from EU-15 countries into Spain and a decrease of 
immigration into Germany. During this period, emigration from Italy to other EU-15 countries 
increased while emigration from the United Kingdom to other Member States decreased. Though 
significant in percentage terms, the changes in immigration and emigration numbers relative to 
overall population stocks remained negligible. 
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Until the onset of the global financial crisis, EU-15 migration flows ran primarily along a north-
south axis and remained limited both in terms of absolute numbers and percentages (Figure 4). 
During this period, Spain received some 80,000 citizens from other EU-15 countries, with retirees 
comprising a significant percentage. Indeed, the number of EU-15 retirees moving to residences 
along Spain’s coastline rose sharply after 2002. This development is reflected to some extent in 
the negative net migration figures for the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Figure 4: Annual net migration of individuals from EU-15 Member States to destination countries,  
 2002–2005 
in thousands and in % of 2002 population
Source: Eurostat.
in % of population (left)
in thousands (right)
Denmark Germany Spain Italy Netherland Austria Finland Sweden UK-0.10
-0.05
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Most EU-15 Member States during this period enjoyed healthy economic growth, a convergence 
in incomes and relatively good labour market conditions, which suggests that push factors had 
limited impact on migration. This is probably most evident in the case of Spain. Spaniards return-
ing from other EU-15 countries accounted for a large share of net migration to Spain in this period. 
Germany, which grappled with a higher than normal unemployment rate during this period, was 
the exception within this generally positive economic picture. However, as indicated, the move-
ment out of Germany was minor in relation to the overall population. 
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Enlargement
In 2004, the European Union was enlarged with eight new Member States from Eastern Europe 
(the EU-8, consisting of Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia), as well as Malta and Cyprus. Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-2, followed in 2007. Most 
older EU Member States imposed temporary restrictions on the movement of workers through 
the implementation of transitional agreements. In the case of the first eastern enlargement in 
2004, only Sweden, the United Kingdom and Ireland elected not to place any restrictions on the 
free movement of workers. Another five countries lifted restrictions in 2006, and only Austria and 
Germany kept restrictions in place for the maximum seven years allowed, until January 2011. 
In the second round of eastern enlargement in 2007, only Finland and Sweden opened up imme-
diately to Bulgarians and Romanians, while eight of the EU-15 countries kept restrictions in place 
for the maximum period of seven years. Among these were the countries with the largest popula-
tions: Germany, Spain, United Kingdom and France. Italy abolished restrictions at the beginning 
of 2012.
Even with restrictions in place – which in most instances meant that workers from new Member 
States had to apply for work permits – there has been substantial east-west mobility (Figure 5a). 
With some exceptions such as Germany, the combination of high levels of growth in the EU-15 in 
the years after 2004 (at least until the end of 2008), and the large relative differences in wages 
have served as substantial pull factors. Generally weak labour markets in the new Member States 
likely acted as a push factor in the early stage of this phase.
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Figure 5a: Foreign stock in EU-15 by citizenship
in millions
Source: Eurostat and Holland et al., 2011.
Note: Some data points concerning EU-8 nationals in EU-15 countries are estimated (this concerns Portugal, 2012; Austria, 2011 and 2012; and 
France 2009–2012. All relevant data for Greece are missing).
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Figure 5b: EU-2 migrant stocks in EU-8 / EU-15 citizens in EU-10
EU-2 migrant stocks in EU-8 EU-15 citizens in EU-10
in thousands
Source: Eurostat and Holland et al., 2011.
Note: The second graph contains rough estimations for EU-15 citizens in Bulgaria, Estonia and Poland. 
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Movement in the other direction – from EU-15 countries to new Member States – has been rela-
tively constant at a rather low level (Figure 5b). East-west mobility began in earnest in 2000 and 
then accelerated slowly, showing notable jumps in 2006 and 2007, and to a lesser extent in 2008. 
Between 1999 and 2009, the number of citizens from EU-8 and EU-2 countries residing in the 
older Member States increased from around one million to almost five million.
The broad composition of this east-west mobility has remained relatively constant, with approxi-
mately half the individuals involved coming from EU-8 countries, and the other half from the 
EU-2. However, there are large differences with respect to the composition of destination countries 
(Figure 6). EU-2 nationals have overwhelmingly gone to Spain and Italy, or to a much smaller 
extent, to Greece, Portugal and Austria. 
Figure 6: Change in stock of EU-10 nationals in EU-15 countries, 1998–2009
in thousands and in % of poulation
Source: Holland et al. 2011.
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EU-8 nationals moved to the United Kingdom and Ireland in great numbers, both in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of UK and Irish nationals. Germany and Spain also received a substantial 
number in absolute terms. Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, as countries with smaller 
populations, received a large influx relative to their size. It is not immediately evident what role 
restrictions played in the composition of these figures. For example, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland opened their borders to the free movement of workers comparatively early, subsequently 
receiving large inflows; however, Sweden was also quite open, and received more modest inflows 
than did Denmark, which imposed restrictions. With its proximity to Poland, Germany would 
likely have captured a larger share of incoming mobility had it not been for its policy of restriction. 
However, given the multiplicity of factors affecting the decision to move, uncertainty is too high to 
reliably estimate the strength of this effect (Holland et al. 2011).
Romania was by far the biggest sending country in the period through 2009 – both in relative 
terms as a percentage of population, and due to its size, in absolute terms as well. Lithuania and 
the Czech Republic have seen close to 5% of their populations leave, and Bulgaria close to 4%. 
Almost 3% of Polish nationals had left the country to work in the EU-15 by 2009. In absolute terms, 
Poland is the second-largest sending country, following Romania. Overall, it is clear that eastern 
enlargement has resulted in an increase in mobility within the EU, but that this has been largely 
unidirectional. 
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EU labour migration during the crisis – does increased labour mobility  
contribute to better labour allocation?
Béla Galgóczi, European Trade Union Institute
There is a general expectation that labour mobility is a major contributor to the better functioning of 
European labour markets, as stated in the European Job Mobility Action Plan (EU Comm 2010). Intra-EU 
mobility can raise the overall GDP of the European Union if it improves labour allocation, through a 
better match of workers’ skills and job vacancies, as per the European Commission (EU Comm 2011). 
Is this indeed the case? Does evidence on cross-border labour mobility following the 2004 and 2007 EU 
enlargement rounds support this positive expectation?
Based on a detailed analysis of European and national-level data sources, our results clearly contradict 
assumptions about “knowledge-driven migration”. As regards skills composition, EU-10 migrants in 
EU-15 labour markets tend to have similar or higher qualification levels than nationals. And this proves 
to be true also for countries that imposed transitional measures, as the example of Germany shows. 
Bettin (2012), in our edited volume, compares the skills mismatch of EU-10 migrants in the United 
Kingdom and Italy. Both EU-10 migrants and nationals in the United Kingdom have a considerably 
higher skills profile than EU-10 migrants and nationals in Italy. EU-8 workers in the United Kingdom 
were considerably overrepresented among medium-skilled and correspondingly underrepresented, to an 
approximately equal extent, among low- and high-skill categories before the crisis. Italy is characterised 
by a high share of medium skills among EU-10 migrants, particularly given that among natives, the 
low-skilled are clearly overrepresented. 
More importantly however, when examining skills/occupation matches, a strong evidence of over-quali-
fication and the corresponding underutilisation of EU-10 migrant workers’ skills emerge as a pervasive 
phenomenon. While British nationals and EU-15 citizens in the United Kingdom are employed mainly in 
white-collar jobs (56% and 64%, respectively, in 2010), for EU-8 and EU-2 migrants, the corresponding 
figures are 18% and 21%. With comparative skill levels, this is a huge difference. As regards Italy, while 
nationals are almost equally distributed between white-collar and blue-collar jobs, the foreign-born 
population is fairly polarised. Eight out of 10 EU-15 citizens are employed in white-collar jobs, thus 
taking advantage of their higher level of human capital. On the other hand, 86% of EU-8 and 95% of 
EU-2 migrants have blue-collar jobs. The jobs-to-skills mismatch and thus the underutilisation of human 
capital of EU-10 migrant workers which has been highlighted by our results points to one of the biggest 
challenges with regard to recent intra-EU labour mobility. This phenomenon also points to a failure of 
migration-related policies that could help to improve the efficiency of cross-border labour mobility.
Further reading
Galgóczi, Béla, Janine Leschke, and Andrew Watt, ed. 2012. EU Labour Migration in Troubled Times: 
Skills Mismatch, Return and Policy Responses. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
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Mobility during the crisis
The onset of the economic crisis in 2008 substantially changed the conditions for east-west mobil-
ity, significantly reducing pull factors associated with easy access to EU-15 labour markets or 
even removing them altogether. Large receiving countries such as Spain and Ireland respectively 
experienced increases in the unemployment rate of ten and seven percentage points over the two-
year period from 2007 to 2009. While the rise in unemployment in the United Kingdom was less 
steep, the rate nevertheless increased from 5.3% to 7.6% in the same period (Table 1).
Table 1:  Unemployment rates in EU-15
in %
2007 2009 2011 2013
EU-15 7.1 9.2 9.7 11.1
Belgium 7.5 7.9 7.2 8.4
Denmark 3.8 6.0 7.6 7.0
Germany 8.7 7.8 5.9 5.3
Ireland 4.7 12.0 14.7 13.1
Greece 8.3 9.5 17.7 27.2
Spain 8.3 18.0 21.7 26.4
France 8.4 9.5 9.6 10.8
Italy 6.1 7.8 8.4 12.1
Luxembourg 4.2 5.1 4.8 5.9
Netherlands 3.6 3.7 4.4 6.7
Austria 4.4 4.8 4.2 4.8
Portugal 8.9 10.6 12.9 16.5
Finland 6.9 8.2 7.8 8.2
Sweden 6.1 8.3 7.8 8.0
United Kingdom 5.3 7.6 8.0 7.7
Note: 2013 data for Austria, Greece, Italy and UK preliminary (2013Q4 is missing).
Source: Eurostat.
28
The situation deteriorated further after 2009, with sizeable increases in unemployment in the 
Nordic countries, France, Italy and Greece. Among the larger (in population) countries, only Aus-
tria, Germany, and the Netherlands showed favourable labour market conditions after 2011. The 
German unemployment rate actually fell after 2011 to the lowest level in two decades. Most new 
Member States also saw labour-market conditions deteriorate to a significant degree during this 
period. 
The change in the economic weather affected both international migration and intra-EU mobility 
flows. From 2008 to 2011 (the latter year being the latest for which consistent cross-national 
data is available for comparison), labour flows to Germany increased four-fold, whereas Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain went from being net immigrant countries to net emigrant countries (Figure 7). 
Net emigration from Poland increased by a factor of four, while Italy saw net immigration decline 
by one-third. 
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Figure 7: Net migration to selected countries, 2008 and 2011
in % of population in destination country
Source: Eurostat.
Note: For Germany, the data refers to the period 2009–2011. Data not available for Bulgaria, Greece and Romania.
UK
Portugal
Poland
Austria
Netherlands
Lithuania
Latvia
Italy
Spain
Irland
Germany
Czech Republic
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0 0.5 1.0
2011
2008
29
History of labour mobility in Europe
Interestingly, Austria and the Netherlands, where labour markets performed relatively well 
through the crisis period, respectively showed no appreciable change in migration rates and a 
decline in net immigration by one-half. Latvia and Lithuania experienced a large increase in net 
emigration, and Czech Republic became a net emigrant country in the same period. For most 
countries, the change in net migration reflects mutually reinforcing shifts in immigration and 
emigration, such as lower immigration rates combined with an increase in emigration in Spain. 
The economic crisis, combined with the end of the transition period for the first round of the 
eastern enlargement, reinforced net emigration trends from the new Member States. While the 
data is not detailed enough to make a definite judgement about destination countries, the steep 
increase in immigration to Germany and the smaller increase to the United Kingdom suggest an 
orientation towards these countries.
Mobility in periphery countries
The periphery countries hardest hit by the economic crisis all saw a reversal from being net 
immigrant to net emigrant countries. The data allow an analysis of emigration by citizenship. This 
sheds light on whether immigration is mostly return migration or nationals leaving their home 
countries. In the cases of Italy and Portugal, more than half of those emigrating were nationals of 
these two countries (Figure 8). This share was somewhat lower for Greece and Ireland, and much 
lower in Spain, where nationals accounted for little more than 10% of total emigration. 
Figure 8: Emigration by citizenship
in % of population, 2011
Souce: Eurostat.
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The destination countries for emigrants from EU-27 countries are most often other EU countries, 
except in the case of Spain, where only 33% of emigrants departed for other EU Member States. 
Around 11% of emigrants from Spain going to a non-EU country migrate to Morocco, with another 
sizeable share going to Latin America. Of those coming from Spain who locate in another EU 
country, 10% go to Romania, indicating some return migration. In the case of Ireland, Australia is 
the preferred destination followed by the United Kingdom, the United States, Poland and Canada 
(DG Employment 2013). 
The evidence presented so far indicates that with the exception of Ireland, the nationals of coun-
tries hardest hit by the crisis demonstrated relatively little mobility. Although nationals of Greece 
and Portugal demonstrated a somewhat higher emigration rate, outflows of nationals from Spain 
and Italy barely reach the 0.1% average for the EU-15 presented in Figure 3.
The official comparable cross-country statistics on migration and intra-EU mobility lag recent 
developments by more than two years. This is a limitation when discussing mobility responses to 
the economic crisis, as the decision to move to another country is itself likely to lag the experience 
of economic hardship by months, if not years. Similarly, potential migrants may be slow to react 
to new opportunities in other countries due to incomplete information flows. Some of these factors 
may moreover play a bigger role for people still living in their home country than for foreigners. 
Foreigners – especially people who have arrived rather recently – have lower so-called sunk costs 
related to home ownership, the loss of social networks and other location-specific issues than do 
nationals. Therefore, the composition of 2011 emigration out of countries hardest hit by the crisis 
may tell us less about differences in the reaction to the crisis than the speed with which different 
groups can act in response to changing circumstances. 
One way to partially address this issue is to look at national data sources which are updated on a 
more regular basis. German social security data and the allocation of national insurance numbers 
in the United Kingdom are well suited for this. The German data indicates how many persons 
are working in Germany by nationality at a given point in time, but not when they arrived. More-
over, self-employed individuals are not covered. National-insurance numbers (NINos) from the 
United Kingdom indicate the number of people who registered in the country in a given period, 
by nationality. Despite their limitations these sources provide a reasonably clear picture of recent 
developments.
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Migrants from EU-8 countries account for the largest share of foreign EU national workers in 
Germany by some distance, with a strong and steady growth rate over the past three years. The 
number of EU-2 workers (which until 2014 were covered by transitional restrictions) and workers 
from Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIPS) remain relatively low in comparison. However, 
the number of EU-2 nationals is rising quickly and can be expected to receive an additional boost 
in 2014 as the last restrictions to mobility are lifted. Taking into account the immense rise in 
unemployment rates in the GIPS countries, the lack of an appreciable increase in the number of 
GIPS workers in Germany is somewhat remarkable. 
In the United Kingdom, the number of EU-8 nationals remains fairly stable, while – as in Germany 
– making up the largest share of migrants overall. The number of registered workers from the 
GIPS countries shows a continuous rise, with a rapid jump in 2013, while registrations by Bulgar-
ian and Romanian nationals decline over the same period.
Figure 9: Social security registrations in Germany and NINo registrations in the UK
Social security 
registrations in Germany
NINo registrations 
in the UK
in thousands
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Germany, and UK Department for Work and Pensions.
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Conclusion
Mobility patterns within the EU have changed considerably during the last decade. Whereas intra-
EU mobility remains low among the older Member States, the process of enlargement (EU-15 and 
eastern enlargement) has been accompanied by a substantial increase in intra-EU mobility as 
people from new Member States are moving west to work in the older Member States. There is 
no indication that this unidirectional mobility pattern has changed significantly as a result of the 
economic crisis. However, migrant destinations among the older Member States have changed. 
The bulk of their movement is now directed at Germany and the United Kingdom, while there is 
limited movement to crisis-stricken countries in southern Europe. 
The mobility of EU-15 nationals in response to the economic crisis has been moderate. With the 
exception of Ireland, there has until 2011 been little mobility of nationals from the periphery 
to other EU countries. More recent data from Germany and the United Kingdom, together with 
indicators suggesting an increased readiness to move in search of jobs, suggest that the number 
of migrants going to Germany and the United Kingdom will increase if economic conditions in 
sending countries do not change significantly. However, this is unlikely to resemble the magnitude 
of ongoing mobility from the east to the west.
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Scenarios for the future of European labour 
mobility 
Jeffrey S. Saunders and Simona Arminaite, Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies
Approach of the study
Government planners, corporate managers and military analysts have long used scenarios as a 
powerful tool to aid in decision-making in the face of uncertainty. This methodology makes an 
important contribution to various policy areas, as it helps legislators, public agencies and private-
sector entities think in a broad, disciplined way about the future when making policy decisions. In 
this study, scenarios are used to assist the development of policy recommendations for harnessing 
European labour mobility. 
A scenario is a story that describes a specific future connected to the present through a series of 
causal links that demonstrate the consequences of decisions or series of decisions. It describes 
events and trends as they could evolve. A scenario should be vivid enough that a planner can 
clearly see and comprehend challenges and opportunities presented by a given environment.
A scenario is not a single prediction or forecast. As the future cannot be known, sets of scenarios 
are used to encompass a broad span of possible futures. If the span of possible futures is suf-
ficiently broad, then plans generated to cope with their eventualities will be robust. Scenarios 
can also alert decision-makers to ways in which policy interventions might make an undesirable 
outcome less likely (Glenn and the Futures Group 2001).
Through input from a cross-disciplinary and pan-European advisory board (see annex for a full list 
of participants), the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies (CIFS) 
have conducted a scenario analysis seeking to answer the following three questions:
1. Which uncertainties could have a high impact on labour mobility?
2. How could/should labour mobility look in 2025?
3. What are the most critical policy recommendations with respect to fostering intra-EU labour 
mobility? 
Scenarios for the future of European labour mobility
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The HELM process combined desk research and input from the HELM advisory board of European 
experts on labour mobility. Input and guidance from the HELM advisory board was solicited via 
four workshops that were held from summer 2013 through winter 2014 (Figure 10). The purpose 
of these meetings was to:
 Bring together different perspectives so as to enable the conceptual cross-fertilisation essential 
to the scenario-building process, by including experts from across Europe representing the 
business, academia, policymaking and labour sectors;
 Produce scenarios for the future of European labour mobility;
 Develop and critically assess policy recommendations for European labour mobility on the 
basis of these scenarios.
Scenarios for the future of European labour mobility
Figure 10:  HELM Process
 
Source: By authors.
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The purpose of the first workshop was therefore to create an understanding of how advisory board 
members perceived the future of labour mobility within the European Union. This was achieved 
via four cross-disciplinary presentations that were used to develop interdisciplinary and inter-
organisational strategic themes. These themes fell into five categories: 
 Transforming power structures
 Boundaries dissolving
 Technological breakthrough
 Economic prospects
 EU policies
From these categories, the HELM advisory board identified more than 50 areas of uncertainty 
(please see appendix for full list of uncertainties).
Between workshops I and II, the uncertainties were expanded into polarities representing two 
extremes of development. For example, for the area of uncertainty concerning labour-market part-
ners in 2025, HELM advisory board members asked whether labour-market partners would be 
open and inclusive towards mobile workers or might instead oppose migrant labour, as it could 
depress the wages of domestic workers. Polarities such as this were used as axes for the scenario 
matrix. 
In Workshop II, the advisory board qualified and assessed the critical areas of uncertainty and 
the associated polarities used to define European labour-mobility scenarios. The polarities and 
uncertainties were evaluated according to the degree of uncertainty associated with them and 
their potential impact on European labour mobility.
Between workshops II and III, CIFS drafted the scenarios, which the advisory board modified 
and approved in Workshop III. The advisory board also provided input regarding relevant policy 
recommendations in each scenario. During the scenario-drafting phase, CIFS tested alternative 
axes in order to ensure that the scenarios exposed clear tensions that challenged the areas under 
study. The following uncertainties were selected from among a wider list of possibilities to form 
the scenario matrix (Figure 11): 
 Economic growth axis – return to growth vs. continued stagnation
 Employment and social-policy axis – changes in European policymaking intended to unleash 
market forces (market-creating policies) vs. changes in European policymaking aimed at cor-
recting market results through regulation and redistribution (market-correcting policies). 
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Economic growth axis
In a vote taken at the second advisory-board meeting, the HELM advisory board elected to work 
with the economic growth uncertainty, which fell under the strategic theme of “economic pros-
pects”. Deemed to hold the greatest uncertainty and impact on European labour mobility, this 
issue also provided distinct alternative contexts for developing future scenarios for European 
labour mobility. The economic growth uncertainty was unfolded into polarities representing a 
“return to growth” and “continued stagnation”.
Employment and social-policy axis
At the third workshop meeting, the HELM advisory board selected the second axis, employment 
and social policy, falling under the strategic theme of “boundaries dissolving”. This was deemed 
to be the area of uncertainty with the most direct impact on European labour-market mobility, at 
least in comparison with the alternative issues of “demand for labour”, “changes in life patterns” 
or the “future of the EU project”. 
The scenarios implied by this axis expose clear tensions that pose challenges to policies support-
ing European labour-market mobility. This area of uncertainty covers a wider area of social issues 
than do uncertainties such as “languages” or “recognition of qualifications”, which have narrower 
focuses. The employment and social policy uncertainty was expanded into polarities described 
as “market-creating” and “market-correcting” following review and input by the HELM advisory 
board.
Five scenarios
The combination of the economic growth and employment and social-policy axes created five 
scenarios (Figure 11). In order to provide clearly distinguishable possibilities for the future devel-
opment of the European Union and its associated patterns of mobility, the scenarios explained 
below have been described in comparatively extreme terms. Just as caricatures overemphasise the 
most prominent traits of a personality, the scenarios have been rigorously drafted to convey their 
most important features. The five scenarios are:
 Polarised Europe
 Marketised Europe
 Regulated Europe 
 Fragmented Europe
 Paralysed Europe 
Scenarios for the future of European labour mobility
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Figure 11: Scenario matrix
Source: By authors.
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Table 2: Scenario grid
 
Indicators Polarised Europe Marketised Europe Regulated Europe Fragmented Europe Paralysed Europe
Era in Europe Polarisation and 
economic instability in 
the region
European prosperity and 
diversity
A stable, integrated and 
prosperous Union
Economic and political 
crisis and extreme 
nationalism
A poorly managed 
attempt at EU 
integration
Economic 
governance in EU
Inter-governmentalism: 
EU institutions (i.e., 
Council) dominated by 
core states; 
austerity through 
binding fiscal rules; 
cost-based competition 
through competitive 
disinflation;
political tensions 
between debtor and 
creditor countries
Deregulation: strong 
economic framework 
(Single Market, single 
currency, competition 
law) enforced by 
Commission and 
European courts; 
nation-states 
deregulate and reduce 
market interventions; 
subnational regions 
(e.g., NUTS 1) grow in 
importance
Integration: Federation; 
stabilisation through 
fiscal transfers and 
risk sharing (e.g., 
eurobonds); further 
institutional and 
economic integration 
(“political union”); 
strengthened role for 
European Parliament
Fragmentation: 
Partial break-up of 
the monetary union; 
European institutions 
lose influence; 
uncoordinated 
national policies (e.g., 
capital controls) and 
protectionism threaten 
EU project and the 
Single Market
Poorly designed and 
implemented pervasive 
political integration: 
Member States and 
EU institutions enforce 
greater institutional and 
legislative integration; 
poor design and 
implementation paralyse 
member economies, 
creating tensions and 
increasing EU scepticism
Growth and 
competitiveness
Stagnation. Core 
AAGR  ≈ 1%, periphery 
has 0 or negative 
growth; divergence 
of competiveness and 
polarisation between 
core and periphery 
AAGR above 2%; 
high and increasing 
competitiveness in 
global marketplace 
driven by thriving 
private sector; 
productivity gains 
based on expansion 
of business and 
financial services and 
international demand; 
consumption/credit-led 
growth
AAGR above 2%; high 
competitiveness driven 
by public investment 
in education, R&D 
and infrastructure; 
productivity gains based 
on capital deepening 
and technology; 
investment/export-led 
growth
AAGR is <1% or 0 
in most countries; 
uncertainty is high, 
preventing private 
investment; low public 
investment due to high 
debt burdens
AAGR is close to 
0 or negative in 
most countries; 
competitiveness 
declines; excessive debt 
financing of welfare 
services and economic 
stimuli
Economic imbalances 
among states
Growing economic 
inequality among 
EU states: strong 
polarisation among core 
and periphery countries; 
different economic 
models coexist
Reduced inequality 
between states due 
to NUTS region-based 
value networks
Reduced inequality 
between states due to 
EU-wide fiscal transfers 
and redistributive 
policies; convergence 
on common economic 
model
Growing economic 
inequality between EU 
countries; few bright 
spots (e.g., London, 
Paris, Vienna); otherwise 
stagnation
Growing economic 
inequality; financial 
transfer systems 
between Member States 
alleviate inequality to a 
certain extent, but also 
provide disincentives 
and lead to moral 
hazard for rich and poor 
countries
Social inequality Growing inequality, 
especially in periphery 
countries that are 
increasingly “left 
behind”
Growing inequality 
due to progressive 
technological change 
and economic 
restructuring (increasing 
automation in 
production and services) 
in conjunction with 
liberalised welfare 
policies
Reduced inequality 
in societies due to 
intensive investment 
in human capital 
and redistributive 
policies counteracting 
dislocations caused by 
greater integration and 
technological change
Growing inequality due 
to high unemployment 
and strained welfare 
budgets
Increased inequality as 
newly enacted reforms 
aggravate labour-market 
segmentation, creating 
a sizeable share of 
working-age population 
that is excluded from 
employment
1  Average annual growth rate
2   Core consists of the most powerful countries which include Germany and France, but also the UK, the Benelux (the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) and the Nordic countries. The periphery is subject 
to decisions made by this hegemonic core and mainly consists of countries lying to the south and east of the EU, as well as Ireland to the west.
Source: By authors.
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Table 2: Scenario grid (continued)
 
Indicators Polarised Europe Marketised Europe Regulated Europe Fragmented Europe Paralysed Europe
Labour market Labour shortages 
in rich regions with 
aged populations; 
high unemployment 
in the countries of the 
periphery
Automation 
transforms labour 
market: digitalisation 
and automation of 
transactional (e.g., bank 
teller, retail cashier) and 
interactional (e.g., nurse, 
lawyer) jobs; low-skilled 
workers are shed
Regional labour 
shortages are balanced 
common EU labour-
market policies and the 
increasing automation 
of labour
High unemployment 
throughout the EU due 
to continued economic 
stagnation and 
economic uncertainty 
following euro collapse
High and long-term 
unemployment, as 
economies fail to adapt 
to the market needs and 
fail to provide workers 
with new skills
Social security National social-security 
systems remain 
intact; policies focus 
on adjusting existing 
welfare models
Social security is 
reduced to a minimum; 
new markets for private-
sector social security 
emerge
Flexicurity: Labour-
market flexibility in 
a dynamic economy 
is combined with 
high levels of income 
security; commission 
develops plans for 
creating an EU-based 
social-security system
High budget deficits 
and unemployment put 
pressure on national 
social-security systems; 
policies focus on saving 
existing welfare models
Austerity programmes 
are reversed and budget 
deficits expand as 
security and benefits are 
provided; Europe-wide 
welfare system emerges, 
which duplicates 
national systems
Ideology/
dominant values
Economic conservatism:
austerity, economic 
patriotism, individual 
responsibility, focus on 
family
Market liberalism:
consumerism, 
individualism, 
competitiveness, free 
trade, efficiency
Social liberalism:
solidarity, sustainability, 
equality, social Inclusion
Social conservatism:
protectionism, 
nationalism, social 
security, traditional 
values
Pan-Europeanism 
at first, but social 
conservatism 
gains traction with 
disillusioned population
Identity National identities Cosmopolitanism Shared European 
identity
Nationalism European identity in 
doubt 
Further EU expansion Core EU countries create 
high barriers to further 
expansion 
EU is attractive for the 
countries in the region 
and open to growing 
markets (e.g., Turkey) for 
further enlargement 
EU is attractive for other 
countries; however, 
presents potential new 
candidate countries with 
high barriers 
EU has lost its 
attractiveness for 
potential new members
EU is unattractive, with 
no potential candidates 
for expansion
Welfare model in 
ascendance
Continental European 
model in core states 
and the British model in 
periphery countries: 
   Rough welfare state: 
more poverty and 
higher inequality
   State provides 
universal single-
payer health care, 
redistributes income 
and guarantees an 
income at subsistence 
level
The Anglo-Saxon/U.S. 
model:
   Each person should 
be left to succeed or 
fail on their own
   Social programmes 
exist only for the 
poor, unemployed 
and those who 
cannot work due to 
youth, old age or 
disability
The Nordic model: 
   Strong influence 
of labour unions 
and employers’ 
organisations
   State provides 
generous 
unemployment 
benefits and 
retraining for those 
made redundant
   Flexicurity model 
combines flexible 
labour markets with 
high levels of social 
security
Continental European 
model:
   Strict rules on job 
protection and a large 
amount of regulation 
in industry
    Labour market is 
inflexible and slow to 
react to globalisation
   Generous insurance-
based unemployment 
benefits, reduced 
poverty and high-
quality health care
Southern European 
model:
    Strict rules on job 
protection and 
inflexible labour 
markets
   Bloated and 
inefficient public-
sector structures
   Fragmented and 
corporatist welfare 
system with 
generous benefits 
for the privileged 
and rudimentary 
protection at the 
margin
   Risk of poverty and 
marginalisation 
grows
 
Source: By authors.
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It is 2025, and with very few exceptions, economic development in Europe has been sluggish 
since 2008. Already existing periphery-core migration patterns have become more pronounced 
as lower-than-average growth rates in more remote parts of Europe drive Europeans in those 
regions to seek opportunities elsewhere. Given the unfavourable economic situation, Europe as 
a whole remains an unattractive destination for labour and capital from outside Europe. Intra-EU 
mobility is driven by need rather than opportunity and is greatest among medium- and low-skilled 
workers, who move from poorer to richer cities, regions and Member States. Economic and social 
polarisation is increasing, creating social and political tensions across Europe.
Summary
Polarised Europe 
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Localism emerges
Driving forces in 
this scenario
Polarisation across 
region 
 The European Union has lost competitiveness on a global scale
 A continued lack of public and private investment 
 A crisis in governance and political tensions
 A lack of leadership at the EU level
 The growing importance of social networks
 Anti-EU parties are popular and increasingly cooperate to derail the EU project 
In 2025, more than 15 years of slow economic growth have frayed European social, political and 
economic fabrics. The EU consists of a patchwork of competing states, regions and cities without 
an overarching vision. Europe has become what Japan was in the 1990s and 2000s – an economy 
in the doldrums and a poster child for the inability to entice investment and growth. Political ten-
sions are widespread among core and periphery countries, and anti-EU parties are successful at 
blocking reform initiatives in the EU parliament. Localism and nationalism have re-emerged as a 
dominant factor in national and EU politics.
EU economies and companies struggle to compete on the global marketplace. In addition, 15 
years of stagnation have caused core and periphery countries to diverge. The European Union is 
polarised between uncompetitive and economically depressed periphery countries and relatively 
strong core countries. Several cross-country divergences in sectoral specialisation have emerged. 
Core countries focus on high-value-added production, while low-value-added and labour-intensive 
industries fl ourish in the periphery. 
Economic growth in the European Union is anaemic as a result. Average annual growth rates 
hover around 1%. Countries on the periphery are lucky to achieve any sustained positive growth. 
Most often their economies stagnate or continue to shrink.
The European Union failed to meet its 2020 targets due to anaemic growth that aff ected public- 
and private-investment activity. Austerity has impacted enrolment rates at European institutions 
of higher learning, while poverty and social exclusion rates continue to rise (see Figure 12 below).
42
The general economic malaise and occasional scandals increase Europeans’ cynicism towards 
major public and private institutions. Almost all European countries enacted austerity programmes 
to balance their budgets throughout the 2010s – some of them voluntarily, others under pressure 
from institutions such as the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
These institutions, governments and economists, however, underestimated the restrictive force 
that austerity programmes would have on future growth.
In response to declining support from state authorities, Europeans in many countries turn to their 
families and their networks to make ends meet. Many underground economies and alternative 
consumption models have emerged across Europe.
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Austerity shrinks 
welfare systems 
Figure 12: Timeline
Source: By authors.
Political
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Technological
2010 2015 2020 2025
EU sceptics become biggest 
parties in many EU countries 
and in EU Parliament
Social systems begin to 
break down because of 
ageing societies 
EU loses 
global war 
for talent
Average annual growth rates 
hover around 1% for the 
next decade
EU does not keep 
up with new 
technology adoption
Europe 2020 targets Achieved*
–
–
0
–
* Target achieved: ++; improvement made: +; no change: 0; slight decline: –; failure:– –.    
Employment: 75% of 20-64-year-olds 
R&D: 3% of the EU’s GDP 
Education: 
    Early school leaving  below 10%
    40% 30-34-year-olds completing tertiary education
Fighting poverty and social exclusion: 
20 million fewer people in or at risk 
Polarised Europe
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Labour-market inequality increases in Europe. Labour markets are highly segmented according to 
nationality, skill level, contract type, etc. In core countries, labour shortages occur due to ageing 
populations. In periphery countries, unemployment rates remain high.
Educational systems in Europe are under pressure, and the skills they impart to European workers 
are outdated. The lack of mutual recognition of diplomas and competences among Europe’s national 
education systems and labour markets makes the common labour market operate ineffi  ciently.
While national social security systems remain intact, policies focus on adjusting welfare models to 
economic conditions. Core states still provide generous insurance-based unemployment benefi ts, 
high-quality health care, and unemployment support. In peripheral countries, the welfare model 
is under pressure. Cutbacks are common, and waiting lists are long and growing longer. 
 
Labour mobility is high and mainly driven by economic necessity. Unstable incomes and high 
unemployment rates in the stagnant countries of the periphery, together with more abundant 
employment opportunities in the prosperous core, encourage workers and their families to search 
for a better life elsewhere. Only a small fraction already have job off ers before moving to their 
destination countries. Instead, they use social networks on an ad hoc basis to determine where to 
move next. Family, relatives and friends in the destination country provide accommodation and 
help newcomers fi nd jobs, sometimes in the shadow economy.
While these workers are often well educated, they overwhelmingly work in low-skilled and low-
wage sectors of the economy. For one thing, the diplomas and competences acquired in their home 
countries are often not fully recognised in destination countries. For another thing, they often 
do not speak the local language and lack the necessary experience to navigate the local labour 
market, leading to discrimination by employers.
The growing migrant communities tend to concentrate in certain neighbourhoods of bigger cities, 
leading to social problems (such as long-term unemployment, homelessness, crime) or fears of 
such. Discussions about a new “immigrant underclass” in the media and in political circles are 
common. 
It has become increasingly clear that states have to invest more in the integration of mobile EU 
workers and their families. This project is resisted by others who point to already empty public 
coff ers. In addition, integration is not considered an appropriate policy objective for groups who 
might be no more than temporary residents. Still, EU workers are needed to fi ll growing labour 
shortages in various sectors of the economy and to stabilise social security systems put under 
pressure by demographic change. Meanwhile, sending countries deplore the depopulation of rural 
regions and the permanent loss, or so-called brain drain, of the young and skilled workers in 
whose education and training they have invested. However, these countries are also increasingly 
dependent on the infl ow of remittances to sustain consumption and investment.
Segmentation in labour 
market
Outdated education 
systems
Social inequality 
increases
Mobility from the 
periphery to the core
Mobile workers mostly 
in low-skilled sectors
Mobility creates 
social problems
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Table 3:  Intra-EU mobility in Polarised Europe
 
Polarised Europe
Size High
Main type (duration) Long-term
Legal form Free movement
Direction Periphery to core
Structure of mobile workforce Medium and low-skilled
Main mechanism /channel Informal networks
Drivers (push/pull)
  Unemployment and low income in periphery countries
  Growth and employment opportunities in the core
Challenges for intra-EU mobility
  Brain drain in sending countries
  Discrimination against non-native workers; skill waste 
  Integration needs of mobile workers
  Increased ethnic and cultural diversity, lower social cohesion
 
Source: By authors.
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The perspective of sending countries: Brain drain or brain gain?
Klára Fóti, Eurofound
The impact of increased labour mobility within Europe in receiving countries has been high on the agenda 
following the two signifi cant waves of EU enlargement (2004 and 2007). Less attention has, however, 
been paid to the perspectives of sending countries, although affected governments have raised concerns 
over the consequences of their citizens’ increased outfl ow. Among migrants, young people are over-
represented, which has implications from both a demographic and an economic perspective. Similarly 
to most EU-15 Member States, the population of these countries is also ageing; the recent economic 
crisis affected national economies with serious social consequences (slow growth, high unemployment, 
increasing poverty rates and inequality). Therefore, if the medium- and long-term perspectives as well 
as the possible policy response to these challenges are considered, it is relevant to ask whether sending 
countries should cope with the consequences of “brain drain”, or whether they could expect rather a 
“brain gain”. Currently it is diffi cult to provide a clear-cut answer to these questions since the picture 
emerging so far seems not only too complex but also shows also a large variation among countries.  For 
example, the available data indicate that the education level of mobile EU citizens tends to be high (espe-
cially from the eight Eastern European Member States (EU-8) which joined in 2004) but that the majority 
are employed in low-skilled occupations. This may suggest that the motivation behind migration may 
not only be the desire to earn higher income but possibly also to escape unemployment. Therefore, if the 
overall picture is considered, there is no evidence of brain drain in general. If, however, certain professions 
are taken into account, for example the migration of highly specialised doctors and the ensuing shortages 
of doctors in the sending country (Eurofound 2013) then some of the signs of brain drain can be detected. 
In this case, the question is whether there could be a chance that such workers will return home in the 
future. The extent of a potential return in general (and possible brain gain) depends to a large extent on 
the economic perspectives of sending countries. So far, return migration has not happened on a massive 
scale (Eurofound 2012), presumably because the impact of the economic crisis was severe in most of 
the sending countries (Poland seems to be an exception, however). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
currently there is hardly any evidence for brain gain. Some country variation can be observed, however, 
also in this regard. For example, in the case of two smaller countries, Slovenia and Estonia, among the 
returnees, students constitute the largest group (Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2012). If the majority of the 
members of this group stay home at least for some time, the countries could benefi t from the knowledge 
students acquired abroad. Even nowadays, however, an increased circularity (circular movement) can be 
observed in intra-EU mobility. This is likely to persist and expand in the future. If, as part of circularity, 
return migration occurs on a larger scale than today, the issue of brain drain and brain gain may not be 
as high on the agenda as it is currently.
Further reading
Eurofound. 2012. “Labour Mobility within the EU: The Impact of Return Migration”. Dublin. 
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Following the debt crises and recessions in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the 
European project has emerged strengthened. Concerted austerity and deregulation programmes 
have led to a new period of growth, restoring EU citizens’ belief in the free market and strength-
ening the European Union’s credibility. The European Union has reverted to a focus on creating 
and maintaining the Single Market, and once again provides a strong economic framework. Its 
growing, more competitive economies increase companies’ hunger for talent: the EU is thus an 
attractive destination for domestic as well as global talent. Due to global competition, technological 
development and deregulation, there is greater variety in the types of employment. A subsection 
of European workers has become nomadic, moving from country to country in search of work. 
New markets for private-sector social security mechanisms are emerging to serve these workers’ 
needs.
Summary
Marketised Europe
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 Increased market liberalisation and deregulation
 Strong growth strengthens EU credibility 
 Subnational and cross-national socio-economic regions emerge as new policy actors
 Acceleration of technological progress automates many jobs in the service and manufacturing 
sectors. Jobs in transactional and complex knowledge-based activities are most aff ected
 Restored public support for the market as the most important coordinating instrument
Following a tough period of political and economic liberalisation, the European Union has shaken 
off  its second period of sclerosis, which lasted from the late 2000s to the mid-2010s. Deregula-
tion and liberalisation has transformed the EU from a region ridiculed by global leaders and 
fi nancial magazines for its lethargic economy and staid businesses to an innovative one with 
globally competitive companies. Many European countries have used Anglo-Saxon – particularly 
U.S.-infl uenced – welfare models as inspiration for their reforms, abandoning traditional values 
of solidarity and social cohesion. European labour mobility – although still below U.S. levels – 
continues to increase as new types of fl exible and short-term employment grow and as dislocated 
workers lacking state support seek employment in other EU countries.
The structural reforms enacted during the 2010s to combat Europe’s economic challenges and 
debt crises helped EU countries regain their competitiveness compared to high-income markets in 
North America and Asia. EU countries lowered corporate taxes and social security contributions, 
and reduced real wage costs. These reforms have kick-started private-sector activity. At the same 
time, the European Union has negotiated and implemented a free trade agreement with the United 
States (TTIP). The integration of these markets has both increased opportunities and competition. 
Business and fi nancial services were the two sectors that have benefi ted most from the EU’s 
renaissance.
However, these reforms have weakened national governments’ relative power compared to the EU 
and regional governments (NUTS 1). The Single Market, single currency, and EU laws and regula-
tions enforced by the Commission and European courts provide a strong economic framework. 
The European Union’s growth rates have averaged more than 2% for the last several years.
 
As a result, the European Union came close to achieving its 2020 targets. Employment rates 
among 20- to 64-year-olds approached 75%. The European private sector has expanded its invest-
ments in R&D, as companies are now willing to take investment risks. However, eff orts to fi ght 
poverty have been less successful. While many citizens in Southern Europe have been able to fi nd 
work again, EU goals for reducing poverty and social exclusion have not been met, in part because 
growing labour-market polarisation has eroded middle-income jobs (see Figure 13 below). 
A liberalised Europe 
re-emerges 
Driving forces in 
this scenario
Economic growth in the 
Single Market
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Deregulation at the national level has empowered subnational (e.g., NUTS 1 regions) and cross-
national regional networks. They are now taking a greater role in developing collaborative labour-
market policies to increase economic efficiencies at the local level. These new centres of power 
increasingly challenge the influence of some national capitals in national and EU political spheres.
Productivity gains in the private sector continue to be permanent and substantial. European com-
panies are early adopters of a number of technologies in the service and manufacturing industries, 
which have impacted a number of transactional (e.g., bank teller and retail cashier) and interac-
tional (e.g., nurse and lawyer) jobs. These jobs are increasingly automated, creating social disloca-
tion in many European countries. Skills maintenance and development have become critical areas 
of policy focus at the EU, national and regional levels.
The automation of transactional and interactional jobs, the growth in temporary employment, and 
the liberalisation and deregulation of welfare services in the majority of EU countries have dra-
matically increased the number of working poor in Europe. The European economy is becoming 
a winner-takes-all-market, where a few are able to capture the vast majority of benefits accruing 
from wealth creation while the rest see their incomes stagnate or even fall.
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Regions emerging 
as loci of power due to 
deregulation
New skills in demand
Winner-takes-all 
labour market
Figure 13: Timeline
Source: By authors.
Political
Economic
Social and demographic
Technological
2010 2015 2020 2025
Structural reforms 
enhance market-driven 
governance
Educational institutions focus 
on ﬂexibility and market-based 
skills development 
EU reduces ageing-related 
challenges by inviting 3rd 
country nationals    
EU economy 
starts to grow 
in 2016
EU one of the world's 
fastest-growing high-
income economies
Breakthrough in services automation and adoption of 
automated decision making in number of industries – 
leads to economic and social dislocation 
Further EU expansion to 
growing countries (e.g. Turkey) 
in the region
Europe 2020 targets Achieved*
++
+
0
–
* Target achieved: ++; improvement made: +; no change: 0; slight decline: –; failure:– –.    
Marketised Europe
Employment: 75% of 20-64-year-olds 
R&D: 3% of the EU’s GDP 
Education: 
    Early school leaving  below 10%
    40% 30-34-year-olds completing tertiary education
Fighting poverty and social exclusion: 
20 million fewer people in or at risk 
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Social inequality increases in line with cuts in social security systems. The state cannot aff ord to 
provide as generously as it once could. Individuals have greater responsibility for their own educa-
tions and pensions. Social programmes exist only for the truly destitute, short-term unemployed, 
and those who cannot work due to disability. A large portion of public-sector spending and welfare 
services has been outsourced. 
Cuts in public services introduce new push factors driving labour mobility in the European Union. 
Faced with a deteriorating quality of life in many economies, more EU citizens are tempted to test 
job opportunities in other European markets.
 
There is greater variety in the types of employment in 2025, including short-term contracts, zero-
hour contracts and temporary work. Remote work is common with companies across Europe, and 
workers work from home, at the offi  ce or unconventional workplaces. Employees hired to long-
term contracts fi nd that while they may have a contract with the company, their actual activity is 
project-based. Their managers no longer expect them to fulfi l one function for an indefi nite period 
of time.
Intra-European labour mobility is likewise high, especially for workers at the top and the bottom of 
the qualifi cation structure. In general, the decline of traditional (localised) values, such as family 
and nation, and a growing orientation towards individualism, consumerism and cosmopolitan-
ism (where English increasingly becomes the language of work) has increased the propensity 
among European citizens to work in another country. For example, large familial structures that 
once were the bedrock of social systems in many European countries have been in decline as 
non-traditional nuclear families (single parents, combined families, and families with same-sex 
parents) have become more common. 
High levels of growth and the constant demand for specialised skills attract high-skilled profes-
sionals to booming European regions and cities. In the “war for talent”, regions and fi rms welcome 
the highly skilled and court them by off ering attractive living conditions, preferential tax rates, 
benefi t packages, etc. Demand for skills, however, changes quickly as skills that are avidly sought 
at one moment become irrelevant the next. Highly skilled workers are at risk of burning out, and 
increasingly have to take responsibility for maintaining their work-life balance.
A subsection of professionals working in the business and fi nancial-services sectors has become 
nomadic. Employment in these fi elds is often project-based. These professionals either move 
between companies and countries on temporary, short-term contracts and assignments or via 
intra-company transfers in large corporations that have subsidiaries in multiple countries. 
Another group of professionals make their careers by selling their services to companies across 
Europe, servicing them remotely, and having to travel to meet customers and project teams in 
person only on occasion.
Social inequality 
increases
Flexibility in 
employment practices 
Mobility is high among 
the high and low skilled
War for talent 
Professional nomads
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The role of short-term moves in intra-EU labour mobility
Anne Green, Institute for Employment Research, University of Warwick
Historically, studies of geographical labour mobility have tended to make a distinction between journeys-
to-work (i.e., commutes) typically undertaken on a daily basis and permanent relocation on a long-term 
basis. Yet the reality is that such types of mobility represent the poles of a continuum, with long-distance 
weekly commuting and short-term moves of longer duration than long-distance weekly commuting, 
but not involving permanent relocation on a long-term basis, lying in between. Such short-term moves 
may be undertaken for a variety of reasons – including simple short-term economic gain, broadening 
experience to enhance longer-term career development, improving language skills and/or discovering a 
different country. There is no precise and agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a short-term move, 
but one working definition of a short-term move is a move between EU Member States for a period of 
less than a year (Green et al. 2009). Likewise, there is no universal recording system for recording such 
short-term moves between EU Member States and neither are existing measurement tools and data 
collection frameworks – including registration systems, censuses and surveys – well designed to capture 
such moves. Hence, short-term moves tend not to be well captured by official statistics.
Yet there are several reasons to suggest that short-term moves will play an increasing role in intra-EU 
labour mobility in the future. First, the internationalisation of labour markets suggests that there will be 
increasing scope for such moves. Second, and relatedly, multinational companies seek to transfer work-
ers between international locations – often on a project by project basis which is associated with short-
term moves. Third, the availability of cheap travel makes short-term moves realisable for many more 
people in a way that was not so possible in previous eras. Fourth, the growth in numbers of students 
and the increased significance of international student mobility has implications for the development 
of “mobility mind-sets” and international social networks, and so for subsequent short-term intra-EU 
labour mobility. Fifth, ongoing developments in information and communications technology make for 
easier recruitment on an international basis and allow those who are internationally mobile to maintain 
close contact with their contacts in other countries, thereby facilitating further short-term moves.
Short-term moves are, at least in part, a reflection of the increasing complexity of intra-EU labour 
mobility – and potentially, albeit not necessarily, short-term intra-EU moves may be advantageous from 
individual, employer and EU perspectives.
Further reading
Green, Anne E., Beate Baldauf, and David Owen. 2009. “Short-Term Mobility: Final Report”. 
Report prepared for the European Commission.
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Increased fl exibility within the labour market is heightened by reduced social security (pensions, 
health care). As a result, new markets for private-sector social security mechanisms are emerging 
to serve these worker needs.
A growing number of workers who lose their jobs due to technological change and disappearing 
industries are looking for work in other EU countries. The ranks of the mobile working poor swell 
as a result. These workers are not necessarily unskilled, but do not possess the skills necessary to 
be competitive in the new “knowledge economy”.
Employment growth is strong in the personal-care economy (housekeeping, maintenance, and 
assistance with children and the elderly). Wealthy households’ demand for services in this sector 
from migrant women is particularly brisk.
In other sectors, as unemployment benefi ts are meagre and of only limited duration, even the most 
unpleasant jobs are taken. Employment is often seasonal (construction, agriculture, hospitality, 
tourism), working conditions are bad, and salaries are low.
Abuse and exploitation of workers is a growing challenge, and media scandals and court cases 
increase in frequency. Workers are recruited by labour brokers and temp agencies in their home 
and destination countries. To mobile workers, these companies sometimes make unrealistic 
promises about living conditions and wages abroad. In destination countries, workers often fi nd 
themselves in a vulnerable position, as they do not speak the local language, are not familiar with 
laws and regulations, and are only partially covered by social security systems. Female workers in 
cleaning, personal care and other domestic services are especially vulnerable.
 
 
Mobile working poor
Abuse and exploitation 
are frequent
52
Scenarios for the future of European labour mobility
Table 4:  Intra-EU mobility in Marketised Europe
 
Marketised Europe
Size High
Main type (duration) Temporary mobility via multiple contractual relationships 
Legal form   Free movement
  Posting of workers
  Intra-company transfers 
  Remote working
  Commuting
Direction Multi-directional
Structure of mobile workforce   Polarised with high mobility at the top and bottom of the skill structure
   Mobility will be high in the sectors of the economy where physical presence is 
required. Others will work internationally via remote work solutions
Main mechanism /channel Market, online exchanges, temporary and recruiting agencies, and informal 
networks
Drivers (push/pull)   Growth and skill shortages in the booming regions and cities
  Cuts in public spending including unemployment benefits
  Dislocation of low-skilled workers due to technological change
Challenges for intra-EU mobility   Education and training of dislocated workers
  Social security for mobile workers
  Exploitation of low-skilled workers
 
Source: By authors.
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Technological perspectives on the future of mobility
Tine Andersen, Danish Technological Institute
Technology has always had a profound impact on the nature of people’s mobility around the globe. The 
great migration wave from Europe to the United States in the early 20th century would not have been 
possible without steamships, and today, mobile workers around the world benefi t from access to cheap 
air travel. 
But how will technologies impact mobility in the future? It is evident that some technologies drive 
mobility, while others will potentially lead to less mobility. 
People who go to another country to work or study often do so only for a limited period. If they have a 
family in their home country, they want to be able to maintain contact. Two types of technology offer 
this opportunity: transport technologies and communication technologies. With a network of motorways, 
high-speed trains and cheap fl ights, it is easy to reunite. And with real-time audio-visual connections, 
people can remain in contact despite being separated by thousands of kilometres. Finally, sending 
money back to the family is greatly facilitated by the increased access to electronic money transfers. 
Also, projects that would have been discarded earlier as overly costly due to communication diffi culties 
or high transport costs become increasingly feasible. Finally, it is easier to work “on the go”, as mobile 
technologies allow workers to remain in contact with their home base.
At the same time, however, the need to travel is in some situations decreasing. Internet-based commu-
nication increasingly enables knowledge workers to remain stationed in front of their computer rather 
than travel in order to collect information and data. Virtual presence is with us: Meetings can be held 
in cyberspace, interviews conducted using internet-based video calls. And the possibilities are grow-
ing: Remote control of a plethora of functions is facilitated through a combination of robotics, sensor 
technologies and the internet. An engineer will no longer need to go abroad to inspect a broken-down 
installation – he can download its data and send instructions to local technicians to repair it. Advanced 
biotechnological analyses, combined with the ability to process and analyse large datasets, increasingly 
allow doctors to diagnose illnesses over great distances and give instructions to local health staff or 
patients or even perform operations using remote-controlled robots. 
In summary, technologies affect mobility in ways that run counter to each other. One consequence could 
be that in the future, mobility will increasingly become the result of conscious and deliberate choices 
made by an individual or company. For those forced to be mobile for economic reasons, the technologies 
needed to ease the inconveniences they face will be available.
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The economic downturn that started in 2008 taught European leaders an important lesson: 
European prosperity could only be achieved via deeper political integration, tighter and greater 
enforcement of regulations, and by furthering the EU project. The goal is now to move towards 
an EU federation with increasing interdependence at all levels. As part of the plan to achieve this 
goal, European leaders and Member States are striving to lay the foundations for a common labour 
market, increase the flexibility and mobility of EU citizens, and strengthen the single currency 
and other EU institutions. Fiscal transfers have slowed the decline of peripheral economies, less-
ening the relevance of push factors as economic incentives for mobility. Mobility has become more 
circular and less permanent, and is based on pull factors such as skill needs. In this scenario, a 
functioning fiscal union has been established; the EU Commission recently announced initia-
tives to develop an EU-level unemployment benefit and social security scheme, which is in part 
designed to further remove potential barriers to mobility.
Summary
Regulated Europe 
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 Political decisions to create a deeper, more interdependent European Union
 Strengthening of social partners’ involvement in the labour market
 Strengthening of Europe-wide labour-market networks and exchanges to promote pan-European 
mobility
 EU and national leaders push society towards responsible solidarity as a means of overcoming 
economic dislocation and potential for social confl ict
 Solidarity, sustainability, equality, social inclusion as main values
Following the fi nancial, debt and economic crises that began in 2008 and lasted for almost ten 
years, European leaders took away one important lesson: Economic prosperity could only be 
achieved by creating a more integrated and tightly regulated Europe. This led to a push for a “new 
Constitutional Treaty”. EU leaders and their national counterparts launched a series of compro-
mises and top-down reforms aimed at the creation of a stable, integrated and more prosperous 
union, well beyond the completion of the Single Market. 
The process can at times be tedious, but the goal is clear: the creation of a federated Europe 
that will off er greater stability through fi scal transfers and risk sharing (e.g., eurobonds), further 
institutional and economic integration (“political union”), and greater democratic involvement by 
strengthening the European Parliament’s role in governance. 
European leaders have prioritised an increase in intra-EU mobility through education programmes 
and the creation of Europe-wide labour market networks and exchanges. Political commentators 
are anticipating the launch of the Commission’s plans for an EU-based social security system, 
which will be presented later in 2025 to further facilitate the mobility of European workers.
As a result of these activities, the European Union came close to achieving its 2020 targets. Employ-
ment rates have approached 75% among 20- to 64-year-olds. R&D spending is growing, driven by 
massive increases in public-sector spending. Such spending includes education, health care and 
infrastructure investments, which are in turn boosting broader economic competitiveness. EU and 
national-government investments are particularly focused on positioning EU companies at the 
forefront of the global energy and smart-infrastructure industries.
Driving forces in this 
scenario
Integrated Europe
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The last ten years have witnessed the cacophony of anti-European movements slowly losing popu-
larity. The overwhelming majority of European leaders and national politicians recognise and are 
able to convince their electorates that a deeper integration of the European project is in Europe’s 
and their own interest. European and national leaders have launched a series of initiatives to cre-
ate a common social-welfare model based on:
 Stability through multilevel economic and social surveillance, fiscal transfers, and risk sharing 
 Stronger social protections for those affected by economic dislocations due to increased inter-
nal competition and technological advancement
 Increasingly unified employment and industrial policies 
Common social-
welfare model
Figure 14: Timeline
Source: By authors.
Political
Economic
Social and demographic
Technological
2010 2015 2020 2025
Member States agree 
on deeper political 
integration
Large investments in 
student-exchange 
programmes
EU economy 
starts to 
grow in 2018
EU-wide ﬁscal transfers 
and redistributive policies 
come into force
Europe becomes the world’s 
leader in sustainable energy 
and smart infrastructures
Next wave 
of EU 
enlargement
The EU Commission initiates 
plans to develop an EU-based 
social-security system
Europe 2020 targets Achieved*
+
+
+
+
* Target achieved: ++; improvement made: +; no change: 0; slight decline: –; failure:– –.    
Regulated Europe
Employment: 75% of 20-64-year-olds 
R&D: 3% of the EU’s GDP 
Education: 
    Early school leaving  below 10%
    40% 30-34-year-olds completing tertiary education
Fighting poverty and social exclusion: 
20 million fewer people in or at risk 
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The European Union’s three policy goals for much of the past decade have been focused on reduc-
ing poverty levels, social exclusion and the economic inequalities both between Europe’s north 
and south and its west and east. The results of this eff ort are fi nally coming to fruition. In 2023, 
EU-wide fi scal transfers and redistributive policies came into force. EU policymakers expect that 
inequality levels among EU countries should in time begin to decline. 
National governments continue to strengthen progressive and redistributive taxation policies, 
provide generous unemployment benefi ts, and off er retraining to workers made redundant. In 
order to gain business-sector acquiescence, national governments have made it easier to lay off  
unnecessary or unproductive workers.
Starting in 2014, working mainly through the implementation of the Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework 2014 – 2020, the European Union has advocated intensifying investment in improving 
human capital so as to help its working population adjust more rapidly to increases in internal and 
global competition and to redundancies caused by technological development and the automation 
of work. 
Skills development and retraining (e.g., active labour-market policies) are increasingly being 
promoted and coordinated at the EU level. The mantra in Brussels and in national capitals is 
that “educational programmes must support market needs”. EU and national leaders continually 
promote closer ties between educational institutions and businesses.
Firms are encouraged to invest in the training and development of their workers via apprentice-
ships or through training programmes for consultants and project employees. The EU continues to 
promote greater mutual recognition of diplomas and competences across Member States.
EU leaders and labour-market specialists point towards the Nordic fl exicurity model as a way to 
help create dynamic labour markets that support the weakest citizens and those dislocated by 
economic integration or technological development. 
A number of countries have begun to rebuild their labour-market policies on the fl exicurity model, 
which combines labour market fl exibility with a high level of income security. Progressive income-
tax policies and a fairly high level of overall taxation by way of fi scal harmonisation have been 
introduced across Member States. This revenue allows for more generous unemployment benefi ts 
and retraining of those laid off .
Towards greater 
economic equality 
among regions
Active labour market 
policies help workers to 
adapt 
Flexicurity 
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Intra-EU labour mobility is relatively moderate, although it is at a higher level than in 2014. Fiscal 
transfers and improving prospects in depressed regions reduce the incentive to move to other 
countries. However, the propensity to live and work in another country is particularly high among 
the young, who consider working abroad for some time an essential part of growing up. Supported 
by public sponsorship schemes and subsidy programmes, young people not only study but also 
work in other European countries to learn new languages, build cultural awareness and gain new 
skills.
Most return to their home country after a few years, and employers are eager to hire these work-
ers that possess a “European background”, making the time abroad an essential asset. Receiving 
countries eagerly welcome the young workers, as they help to ease labour and skill shortages in 
regions affected by ageing. In addition, companies recognise that mobile workers bring innovative 
potential and new experiences to their jobs.
The EU Commission has focused on facilitating labour mobility in order to ease internal imbal-
ances. It has strengthened the EURES network to enable the movement of workers from areas with 
a labour surplus to those experiencing shortages. The EURES network of public-employment ser-
vices has developed into the most significant hub for job and training placements across Europe, 
providing not only job offers and support, but also funds for language and cultural courses. Euro-
pean mobility is becoming multi-directional as awareness of opportunities – even in periphery 
countries – grows. While moving without support is associated with considerable risks and uncer-
tainties, moving within the EURES framework gives workers a large network of resources they can 
draw upon to make their move a success. 
Despite these developments, older workers have a lower propensity to move, as they have acquired 
greater degrees of social protection and larger pension entitlements. While diplomas and degrees 
are commonly recognised across Europe, competences acquired on the job after the completion of 
formal training are still difficult to transfer to a new job in the same or in another country. 
The European Commission has announced plans for creating an EU-wide unemployment benefit 
and social security scheme. Political commentators expect that this will lead to significant growth 
in public spending due to the costs of integrating policies. However, these integration policies 
receive strong support from the population at large, as they are based on the values of solidarity, 
sustainability, equality and social inclusion.
Mobility is moderate 
due to effects of 
fiscal transfers, but high 
among young people
Migration is circular
Facilitation of 
labour-market mobility
Labour mobility 
of older employees 
remains low
EU-based social-security 
system is in the works
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Table 5:  Intra-EU mobility in Regulated Europe
 
Regulated Europe
Size Moderate
Main type (duration) Circular, relatively short-term
Legal form   Free movement
  Posting of workers
Direction Multi-directional
Structure of mobile workforce All skills levels where physical presence is required, mainly young workers
Main mechanism /channel Public institutions (PES, EURES)
Drivers (push/pull)   Labour shortages in some regions due to demographic change
  Recognition of innovative potential of mobile workers 
Challenges for intra-EU mobility    Organising EU-wide labour and skill matching (labour market forecasts, 
analysis of skill shortages, etc.)
   EU-based unemployment insurance and transferability of pensions and other 
insurance schemes
  Coping with variety of languages and cultures 
  Mindsets towards immigration
 
Source: By authors.
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The potential of labour mobility in increasing innovation, 
productivity and growth
Stefan Vetter, Deutsche Bank Research
Labour mobility is beneficial for the individual if the likelihood of finding a job or the potential wage is 
higher abroad than at home. However, there are also economic benefits at the aggregate level. Better 
employment opportunities abroad accrue when there is a shortage of adequately trained local residents. 
Labour mobility thus leads to a reallocation of workers from less productive to more productive sectors. 
But mobile citizens contribute to economic growth not only by achieving a better matching of the supply 
and demand for labour but also via the diffusion of knowledge and skills, which increases productivity 
and innovation capacity. 
A valid concern in the context of skilled migration is the possibility of “brain drain”. However, with the 
exception of very few specific sectors, this concern is often unfounded, especially in view of the low 
labour mobility in the EU. For the vast majority, international migration is skill-enhancing as it offers 
employment opportunities which are unavailable at home. In countries plagued by high unemployment, 
there is often also a scarcity of adequate jobs in high-skill occupations. This leads to a cascade where 
high-skilled workers have to accept medium-skill jobs, and medium-skilled workers move to low-skill 
occupations. Thus, we observe the twin phenomena of high unemployment and a high share of the 
population working in occupations which do not match their skill level. Both groups can improve their 
economic situation and enhance their skill set by being internationally mobile. 
Eventually, the majority of mobile workers sooner or later return to their home country. In fact, it is often 
because of the additional qualifications acquired abroad that they become particularly attractive to 
companies at home. The domestic economy receives better-trained workers than it has sent away, and 
the net result is actually a “brain gain”. The presence of a better-trained workforce has a positive effect 
on productivity, and economic studies have shown that this holds especially true if mobile workers have 
complementary skills to the ones of the existing workforce. However, the availability of more qualified 
workers will also induce companies – local as well as foreign – to establish and invest in skill-intensive 
and high-technology industries. Unless income differences between countries are so huge that they 
seriously inhibit the return migration of high-skilled workers, a mobile labour force is ultimately to the 
benefit of both the home and the destination country.
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The European project is in a shambles. The less competitive countries have left the euro, as they 
can no longer bear the costs of staying inside the framework. The European Union is no longer 
an attractive partner for countries that once considered themselves prospective members. The 
European Union is caught in a “doom loop,” and its economic competitiveness compared to other 
major regions continues to decline. Member States struggle to maintain their welfare services in 
the face of creditor pressure for increased austerity. As a result, EU citizens’ optimism is at an all-
time low. Instead of moving to other EU countries, talented EU workers often choose to migrate to 
other, more dynamic regions. The level of intra-EU mobility is very low. It is better to stick with the 
security and benefi ts that you know rather than risk an uncertain future in another part of Europe.
Summary
Fragmented Europe
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 European states in crisis, with conflicts in the region
 Financial regulation has failed
 Increasing antagonism towards the European project 
 Europe has lost competiveness in the global economy 
 Constrained leadership at EU level
The EU project is a shambles. The last 11 years have been one long period of economic and politi-
cal deterioration, with several periphery countries leaving the euro in 2018. Economic crisis and 
extreme nationalism threaten the EU project.
Economic growth hovers around zero or is negative in most countries. Countries on the periphery 
of the euro have begun to reintroduce their former national currencies. During this period of 
instability, EU countries have introduced capital controls and other national regulations in an 
uncoordinated manner. Protectionism threatens what remains of the EU project and the Single 
Market. The European project has lost its attractiveness to countries that were once perspective 
members. No one talks seriously about enlargement anymore.
European national economies are deindustrialising at an accelerating pace as companies seek 
stable operating environments elsewhere. It is a disorderly breakdown. Massive budget cuts in all 
countries are threatening future prospects, as educational institutions cannot adjust their offer-
ings to local market needs. Talented individuals from both inside and outside the European Union 
seek educational opportunities in North America and Asia instead of within EU countries. 
Interventionism and protectionism have increased economic inefficiencies across Europe. Hi-tech 
and life-science industries are moving to other, more stable regions around the globe. Innovation 
capacity is extremely low, and most companies focus on increasing their resilience by decreasing 
their labour and other costs. As a result, flexible contracts, zero-hour contracts for jobs requiring 
on-call availability, and marginal employment grow across Europe. 
The European Union has failed to meet its Europe 2020 targets. Employment rates continue to 
drop, a phenomenon that has in turn reduced private- and public-sector investment in R&D. Social 
exclusion and poverty rates are on the rise as unemployment strains public budgets across the 
European Union (see Figure 15 below).
Driving forces in 
this scenario
Economic and political 
deterioration
Single Market under 
threat
Lost innovation 
capacity
Talent leaving the EU
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High unemployment levels persist across Europe due to continued economic stagnation and eco-
nomic uncertainty. National social-security systems are under pressure, and policymakers focus 
on saving existing welfare models. 
This ambition comes under strain, as public spending has exploded due to huge expenditures on 
social security combined with declining tax receipts. Europe faces a number of debt crises across 
the continent. The welfare state is being hollowed out across Europe to meet debt obligations and 
due to creditor-nation demands. 
Countries make eff orts to protect the jobs they can. The ad hoc imposition of regulations in a 
number of industries distorts the European economy and undoes many of the EU’s achievements 
over the last 40 years.
Growing costs of 
existing welfare models 
Figure 15: Timeline
Source: By authors.
Political
Economic
Social and demographic
Technological
2010 2015 2020 2025
Anti-European forces 
unify, get elected and 
block further integration
Large wave of emigration EU 
citizens to more dynamic 
regions beyond the EU
Nationalist forces initiate a 
wave of protests against EU 
in most Member States
Economic growth hovers around 
zero or is negative in most 
countries for the next decade
Several periphery 
countries leave 
the Eurozone
EU Member States lose 
global competitiveness in 
primary and applied R&D
Europe 2020 targets Achieved*
–
–
0
0
* Target achieved: ++; improvement made: +; no change: 0; slight decline: –; failure:– –.    
Fragmented Europe
Employment: 75% of 20-64-year-olds 
R&D: 3% of the EU’s GDP 
Education: 
    Early school leaving  below 10%
    40% 30-34-year-olds completing tertiary education
Fighting poverty and social exclusion: 
20 million fewer people in or at risk 
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Labour mobility is at a historic low. Due to continued stagnation and high levels of economic 
uncertainty, EU citizens prefer to stick with the security and entitlements they have in their home 
countries, rather than risking an uncertain future in another part of Europe. People who move 
primarily do so for private or family reasons. Instead, an increasing number of EU citizens who 
lived abroad are returning to their home countries, as they feel less and less welcome in their new 
homes. 
Values such as protectionism and nationalism dominate the public discourse and receive massive 
support from an increasingly intolerant electorate. Discrimination and xenophobia spread across 
the region as a result. “Jobs for nationals only” is the motif behind new government policies to 
restrict the labour-market access of non-citizens. Welfare-state services are increasingly limited 
to the native population and exclude foreigners, regardless of whether they come from inside or 
outside the European Union.
Protectionism and 
nationalism dominate
Migration to home
Table 6:  Intra-EU mobility in Fragmented Europe
 
Fragmented Europe
Size Low
Main type (duration) Long-term
Legal form   Free movement
  Barriers increase, but low
Direction Return migration
Structure of mobile workforce Non-work related 
Main mechanism /channel Informal networks
Drivers (push/pull)   Personal reasons
  Discrimination in host countries 
Challenges for intra-EU mobility   Nationalism and xenophobia spreading across Europe
  Desperate welfare challenges in periphery
  Emigration from European Union to other regions of the world
 
Source: By authors.
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The benefi ts of labour mobility from an individual perspective 
Claire Dhéret, European Policy Centre
With each successive wave of EU enlargement, discussions over the costs and benefi ts of labour migra-
tion have increasingly caught the attention of policymakers and commentators. 
However, an objective analysis of costs and benefi ts should be far less simplistic than the negative pic-
ture that some policymakers are currently presenting. Labour mobility can generate both challenges and 
opportunities which vary according to time, location and the people concerned. Current debates should 
therefore focus rather on identifying the right policies to maximise the benefi ts of labour mobility, instead 
of thwarting it. Adopting a change of attitude towards labour mobility is all the more important given 
that being mobile can have signifi cant positive effects on EU citizens. Indeed, labour mobility often offers 
considerable benefi ts for an individual’s future. Although moving to another country can be a huge under-
taking, people do generally move for good reasons, be it for family, a job and/or lifestyle-related interests. 
Current research on the impact of labour mobility on individuals often highlights short-term effects, in 
order to highlight negative phenomena such as workers taking jobs for which they are overqualifi ed, 
possible “down-skilling” or the burdens of working overtime. Although these arguments are generally 
backed by strong evidence, they neglect the long-term view, as more positive developments could be 
charted over time. Indeed, there is very little knowledge of how EU mobile workers adjust to labour 
markets, and it should be kept in mind that such workers might simply need time to fi nd the right job 
which truly matches their level of qualifi cation.
Moreover, experiencing a period in a job for which one is overqualifi ed does not reveal everything 
about the potential benefi ts a mobile worker could gain from labour mobility. Indeed, post-enlargement 
migrants are considered to be among the largest winners with regard to labour mobility in the EU. 
Even if down-skilling might be a real issue in the short term, post-enlargement migrants have also 
benefi ted from higher salaries and higher living standards in the EU-15 due to signifi cant wage and 
unemployment gaps between sending and receiving countries (Kahanec 2012). In addition, EU mobile 
workers also enjoy better career prospects, even if they briefl y are overqualifi ed for work done in their 
host country, when they come back to their home country. The kind of skills and knowledge acquired 
abroad, such as learning a language, increase an individual’s human capital. Last but not least, mobility 
experience signals to employers that an individual is fl exible and has the capacity to adapt to a new 
system, which increases his or her employability in the future.
Further Reading:
Dhéret, Claire, Alex Lazarowicz, Nicoli Francesco, Yves Pascouau, and Fabian Zuleeg. 2013. 
“Making Progress towards the Completion of the Single European Labour Market”. 
EPC Issue Paper 75. European Policy Centre.
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In a hasty attempt to overcome the crisis, EU leaders relentlessly pushed for pervasive political 
integration through much of the 2010s, regarding political integration as a panacea that would 
lead Europe out of its slump. In 2025, Europeans are now aware that this political integration has 
exacerbated existing structural problems rather than ameliorating them. For example, larger EU 
and national budgets financed through more aggressive taxation schemes at the EU and national 
levels have led to higher costs for companies. These companies have responded by moving opera-
tions outside of Europe or shutting down.
Summary
Paralysed Europe
67
Scenarios for the future of European labour mobility
The need for structural reforms is paramount. The European Union and its members, however, 
have adopted a rigid and rule-based approach to regulation, creating infl exible bureaucracies. 
These sclerotic structures and regulations prevent taking action. Although it is now easier to 
move around Europe, few do so. Instead of moving to other EU countries, mobile workers choose to 
migrate to other, more dynamic economies in Latin America, Asia, North America and Australia.
 Poorly designed and implemented political integration
 European fi scal transfers introduce moral hazard and disincentives for reform throughout 
Europe
 Duplicated, outdated, and bloated public-sector structures at European and national levels 
 Member economies are paralysed, and European competitiveness declines due to high tax bur-
dens and over-regulation
 Stagnant or negative growth across Europe
 Initial pan-Europeanism, today replaced by social conservatism across Europe
The EU project has become a “good thing gone bad”. European economic competitiveness contin-
ues to decline. Political leaders in Member States, while driving for an expansion of EU competen-
cies, were unwilling to let go of national competencies. This resulted in a duplication of national 
institutions at the European level. An attempt to drive a new era of EU integration has failed due 
to poor design and implementation. The European Union now suff ers under sclerotic growth, and 
its population is increasingly disillusioned with the EU project. 
European and national leaders saw that a fi scal union was essential for maintaining the euro 
zone’s integrity and stability. European leaders argued that a strong monetary union could not 
function over the long term without a fi scal union. Despite popular reticence in a few heavyweight 
countries, European elites were able to create slim majorities across Europe in favour of a new 
fi scal union. 
While national social-security systems remain intact, EU policies focus on stabilising the weak-
est countries’ social-security systems as a counterbalance to the negative consequences of fi scal 
austerity. Core states still provide generous insurance-based unemployment benefi ts, high-quality 
health care, and unemployment support. Despite help from core countries, the welfare model 
in peripheral countries is under pressure. Cutbacks are common, and waiting lists are long and 
growing longer.
Recently launched, but misguided fi nancial-transfer systems between Member States have ful-
fi lled fi scal-union naysayers’ worst fears. The fi scal union introduced disincentives and moral 
hazard in poorer, less productive countries, further eroding productivity in periphery economies. 
Driving forces in this 
scenario
European integration 
has become a “good 
thing gone bad”
Fiscal union seen as 
essential for euro 
zone stability
German naysayers’ 
fears realised 
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Over-regulation has exacerbated Europe’s productivity crisis. Growth has been stagnant for much 
of the last decade, and many countries’ economies continue to contract. For the last decade, Euro-
pean leaders have sought to employ political reforms backed by debt financing to stimulate the 
economy, but to little effect. These efforts now severely constrain governments’ capacity to act.
European and national leaders have introduced strict rules on job protection, as well as other labour 
regulations that have made the labour market increasingly inflexible. New measures intended to 
protect jobs have had the opposite effect, reducing foreign investment and increasing incentives 
for companies to move operations abroad. At the same time, EU leaders have worked to improve 
labour mobility within the European Union in an attempt to counteract internal imbalances. 
While poorer countries show anaemic economic performance, rich European countries perceive 
the effects of moral hazard. This creates growing intra-European tensions, along with disillu-
sionment and even scepticism towards politics and the EU project among populations in core 
EU countries. Tax avoidance and evasion are growing challenges, and anti-tax movements are 
becoming more popular. These movements are seen as a protest against out-of-control spending 
and inefficient government. The prevalence of informal and undeclared economic activities is 
rapidly rising across the EU, further reducing government revenues from taxation and social 
contributions.
Social inequality increases as technological progress transforms the economy. In response, 
European and national leaders attempt to improve European educational systems from a state-
led perspective. Yet educational reforms simply cannot keep pace with changing marketplace 
demands. Those with the right skill-sets find few opportunities in Europe due to the region’s poor 
competitiveness. 
As a result, the European Union has failed to meet its Europe 2020 targets. Employment rates 
continue to decline, reducing private-sector investment in R&D. Interest in education also falls as 
the population sees a large portion of graduating students going directly on unemployment rolls. 
Public expenditures in R&D lead to few economic or social benefits, and are not enough to replace 
cuts imposed by private-sector companies. Social exclusion and poverty rates rise as unemploy-
ment strains public budgets across the European Union (see Figure 16 below).
The general lack of economic progress, increasing perception of moral hazard among periphery 
states by core states, and growing social inequality are producing a disillusioned population that 
is sceptical of the European project. On a personal level, although it is now easier to move around 
Europe, few choose to do so. Instead of moving to other EU countries, talented EU workers often 
choose to migrate to other, more dynamic regions. Those who do migrate internally do so for per-
sonal reasons. The European Union is no longer attractive to potential candidates for expansion. 
 
Stagnant and negative 
growth across the EU
Scepticism grows in core 
EU countries
Social inequality grows
European Union fails to 
achieve 2020 targets
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Popular scepticism toward the EU project is also growing due to perceptions about an increasing 
number of “poverty migrants” showing up in larger European cities. They are mostly part of social 
groups that are marginalised in their home countries, and who have nothing left to lose. While 
their primary goal is to make ends meet by fi nding jobs in the expanding informal economy, the 
public impression is that these people are coming to illegitimately claim social assistance and 
welfare services in the more generous Western European welfare states. This leads to grumblings 
that “welfare scroungers” should be kept out. Voices calling for restrictions on the mobility of 
these groups for reasons of “public security” and “public health”, or even for an end to the regime 
allowing free movement between countries, are becoming louder.
 
Fears over welfare and 
poverty migration
Figure 16: Timeline
Source: By authors.
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Social and demographic
Technological
2010 2015 2020 2025
EU countries 
agree on deeper 
integration
EU citizens’ 
optimism is at 
an all-time low
Economic growth remains around 
zero or is negative in most 
countries for the next decade
Issued common EU regulations 
for industries limits their ﬂexibility 
in a global context
International companies move 
their R&D outside Europe due 
to heavy regulations
Political integration 
exacerbates existing 
structural problems
Europe 2020 targets Achieved*
–
–
0
–
* Target achieved: ++; improvement made: +; no change: 0; slight decline: –; failure:– –.    
Paralysed Europe
Employment: 75% of 20-64-year-olds 
R&D: 3% of the EU’s GDP 
Education: 
    Early school leaving  below 10%
    40% 30-34-year-olds completing tertiary education
Fighting poverty and social exclusion: 
20 million fewer people in or at risk 
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Table 7:  Intra-EU mobility in Paralysed Europe
 
Paralysed Europe
Size Low
Main type (duration) Long-term
Legal form   Free movement
  Barriers decline, but few take advantage of the opportunity
Direction Emigration out of Europe
Structure of mobile workforce Non-work related 
Main mechanism /channel Informal networks
Drivers (push/pull)   Personal reasons
  Poverty and marginalisation of disadvantaged groups
  Generous welfare systems in destination countries
Challenges for intra-EU mobility   Scepticism and disillusionment with the EU project
  Overcoming low-mobility mindset despite declining barriers
  Emigration from European Union to other regions of the world
  Poverty and welfare migration
 
Source: By authors.
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Welfare migration: Myth or reality?
Lucia Mýtna Kureková, Slovak Governance Institute
Understanding the impact of welfare systems on migration fl ows and their composition occupies 
an important share of migration studies. While the public in advanced countries believes that many 
migrants come to exploit generous social nets, evidence on higher welfare usage among migrants is 
rather inconclusive: It varies across countries, across immigrant groups and over time. Rigorous studies 
in general fi nd that higher welfare take-up among migrants essentially disappears once we take into 
account factors such as sectors of employment and other individual characteristics. Moreover, intra-EU 
migrants and, especially, third-country migrants, face constraints on access to welfare systems in host 
countries. Most social rights are conditioned on previous contributions to the welfare system in the form 
of legal employment. Welfare take-up of migrants is circumstantial to particular institutional features of 
welfare regimes (i.e., eligibility criteria) and the interaction of home and host countries’ welfare systems. 
The welfare magnet debate also dominated policy discussions prior to the eastern enlargements of 
the EU in 2004 and 2007. Due to fears of welfare misuse, EU-15 countries introduced precautionary 
measures, such as transitory periods on the free movement of labour or adjustments to social benefi ts 
entitlements. For example, although the United Kingdom liberalised its labour market for EU-8 work-
ers from May 2004, it introduced a mandatory worker registration scheme. This tool was established 
to monitor labour market developments and react with further adjustments if proven necessary, but 
also entailed important legal elements with repercussions on welfare access. Further, a requirement of 
continuous legal employment of 12 months with breaks of less than 30 days was included as a condition 
for passing the habitual residence test required for many means-tested benefi ts. Empirical evidence on 
EU-8 migrants in the United Kingdom found that migrants were much less likely to claim benefi ts and 
social housing than were natives, and that EU-8 migrants, among all immigrant groups, rely on welfare 
the least, with the exception of child benefi ts and tax credits. 
While transitory periods have passed, access to social rights for migrants from new accession states con-
tinues to be conditioned on the existence of an employment history in a host country. This means that 
a range of social citizenship rights are in many countries granted or adjusted based on previous formal 
legal employment and its suffi cient duration. For the case of intra-EU migration, diffi culties in transfer-
ability of social rights (social insurance benefi ts or pension rights) belong to key setbacks towards higher 
levels of labour mobility. Furthermore, an important factor shaping intra-EU labour mobility is the wel-
fare systems in home states, which profoundly shape opportunities and constraints in domestic labour 
markets and directly and indirectly affect migration choices. 
Further reading:
Mýtna Kureková, Lucia. 2013. “Welfare Systems as Emigration Factor. The Case of Central and Eastern 
Europe.” Journal of Common Market Studies 51 (4): 721–39.
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HELM policy recommendations
Eric Thode and Joscha Schwarzwälder, Bertelsmann Stiftung
Based on the five scenarios and additional research carried out within the HELM project, this 
section presents 16 strong policy recommendations aimed at harnessing European labour 
mobility. Developing policy solutions to facilitate cross-border labour mobility is not an easy 
task, given the heterogeneous nature of various mobility patterns across Europe and the variety 
of policies and institutions that impact and are impacted by labour mobility. Various groups 
within the labour market face different challenges when taking up jobs in another country; 
policies thus have to be adapted to national, regional and local circumstances. The five scenarios 
outlined above highlight the broad range of variables that have to be factored in for any policy 
to be successful, and therefore provide a valuable framework by which to think about necessary 
policy changes.
The recommendations were derived from the scenarios in the sense that they each address spe-
cific requirements and challenges for intra-EU mobility posed by the scenarios. They were then 
developed with reference to existing polices at the EU and member-state level, detailing areas 
where further action was deemed most necessary. Of course, the list of policy proposals cannot 
offer a detailed blueprint for reform, and any initiative for harnessing labour mobility should take 
into account the following points.
First, as is generally the case when devising policies, there are no one-size-fits-all solutions when 
it comes to fostering cross-border labour mobility. As already mentioned, policies will have to be 
adapted to national and local circumstances. In some respects, some countries may already be 
performing much better than others, and while this presents an opportunity for learning from 
other countries, reforms have to be implemented with an eye to existing institutions as well as to 
prevailing societal attitudes and values. There is also a strong need to look separately at particular 
segments and groups within society, in particular women, the comparatively less skilled, and 
younger workers.
Second, only a joint effort by all stakeholders playing a role in cross-border labour movements 
will enable Europe to increase mobility and maximise mobility’s positive impact. Although the 
policy recommendations below focus on possible contributions at the national-government and 
EU levels, non-governmental activities in support of mobility are no less important. In particular, 
regional and local authorities, employers and trade unions, and other civil society organisations 
can be key partners in building frameworks that promote and facilitate intra-EU labour mobility.
Third, there is a need to develop a comprehensive strategy for a common European mobility policy 
that goes beyond the technical and administrative aspects of various policies and programmes. 
The opportunities of the European labour market must become more visible, and people should 
ideally perceive a single comprehensive mobility policy associated with specific institutions, 
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keywords and procedures. Otherwise, the EU might end up with a well-organised mobility regime 
that people simply are not aware of.
Finally – a key point of the current study – policymakers have to bear in mind that the very same 
set of policy proposals can have different impacts under varying future developments. While some 
policy recommendations would be viable regardless of how the future develops within Europe, 
others may work only in certain settings and under certain circumstances. For this reason, the 
HELM policy proposals are “stress-tested” in the following section by evaluating their degree of 
effectiveness in and applicability across the five scenarios. The stress-testing exercise carried 
out by the HELM advisory board allows policy recommendations to be further differentiated, and 
enables identification of the steps most necessary in progressing toward the goal of a common 
European labour market.
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Table 8:  Intra-EU mobility in five different scenarios
 
Polarised Europe Marketised Europe Regulated Europe Fragmented Europe Paralysed Europe
Size High High Moderate Low Low
Main type 
(duration)
Long-term Short-term migration 
via multiple contractual 
relationships
Circular Long-term Long-term
Legal form Free movement Posting of workers
 Intra-company transfers 
Remote working
Commuting
Free movement
Posting of workers
Free movement
Barriers increase, but 
low
Free movement
 Barriers decline, but few 
take advantage of the 
opportunity
Direction Periphery to core Multi-directional Multi-directional Return migration Emigration out of 
Europe
Structure of mobile 
workforce 
Medium and low-skilled Polarised, with high 
mobility at the top 
and bottom of the skill 
structure
All skills levels where 
physical presence is 
required, mainly young 
workers
Non-work related Non-work related 
Main mechanism /
channel
Informal networks Market, online 
exchanges, temp and 
recruiting agencies
Public institutions  
(PES, EURES)
Informal networks Informal networks
Drivers (push/pull) Unemployment and low 
income in periphery 
countries
 Growth and employ-
ment opportunities in 
the core
Growth and skill 
shortages in the 
booming regions and 
cities
Cuts in public spending, 
including unemployment 
benefits
Dislocation of low-
skilled workers due to 
technological change
Labour shortages in 
some regions due to 
demographic change
Recognition of 
innovative potential of 
mobile workers 
Personal reasons
Discrimination in host 
countries 
Personal reasons
 Poverty and 
marginalisation of 
disadvantaged groups
Generous welfare  
systems in destination 
countries
Challenges for 
intra-EU mobility
Brain drain and brain 
waste
Need to integrate 
mobile workers
Increased ethnic and 
cultural diversity, lower 
social cohesion
 Education and training 
of dislocated workers
Social security for 
mobile workers
Exploitation of low-
skilled workers
Labour and skill 
matching across the EU 
Variety of languages 
and cultures
 EU unemployment 
insurance
Transferability of 
pensions and other 
insurance schemes
 Nationalism and 
xenophobia spreading 
across Europe
Desperate welfare 
challenges in periphery
Emigration from 
European Union to other 
regions of the world
Scepticism and 
disillusionment with the 
EU project
 Overcoming low-
mobility mindset despite 
declining barriers
Poverty and welfare 
migration
Emigration from 
European Union to other 
regions of the world
 
Source: By authors.
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Perception of individual-level benefits for mobile workers and migrants 
within the EU: the need for (a) common sense (of place)
Ricard Morén-Alegret, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Migration within Europe is nothing new and, beyond the sound of what might be heard as trumpets 
of the apocalypse, there is a long history of migration across borders that have instead been music to 
European ears, helping to overcome economic gaps and political conflicts (Pascual 1970). Of course 
migration and mobility are not always harmonious – sometimes there is a lack of rhythm (the supply of 
workers does not cover existing demand) or the rhythm instead seems too fast (multiple immigration 
waves in a short period can be perceived as overwhelming). Today, if the EU-28 is considered a musical 
ensemble, the common European orchestra needs to play smarter and in tune. This lack of harmony 
can be an opportunity for common improvement. Regarding migration or mobility within the EU, it 
would be wiser to bear in mind a wide meaning of “benefit”, such as “a favourable or helpful factor or 
circumstance”, than to consider just a narrow meaning, such as “payment” (Thompson 1995). A score 
is often helpful when playing music and, similarly, scientific research can be helpful in designing a new 
European policymaking framework on mobility and migration. There is a need for more evidence-based 
research about the current migration situation. Regarding both individuals on the move and potential 
future migrants, such European policies should take into account that there is a link between emotion 
and movement between places. A sense of place may be felt on many scales, and there is no single sense 
of place, but rather many embedded and interconnected feelings that may be seen in particular settings 
(Mendoza and Morén-Alegret 2013). Accordingly, the perception of individual-level benefits for mobile 
workers and migrants within the EU may take place on several scales. There is not only the need for 
multilevel governance on migration (Zincone, Penninx and Borkert 2011), but also a possible multiscale 
sense of place among EU citizens has to be taken into account. If the goal is to be a lasting union, 
Europe should then be considered as a welcoming place where individuals can find a place to truly live, 
not just a general or abstract political space. Europe, then, as a place of places. “Places exist not only 
as physical entities but also as a result of people’s different experiences, and places are full of meaning 
and encompass an existential dimension, an emotional link with the human being. People’s lives occur 
in and interact with specific places with well-defined attributes … In an increasingly unequal global 
world, places may acquire a greater role in providing security and assurance for individual identities” 
(Mendoza and Morén-Alegret 2013). However, regarding mobility and migration, does Europe have 
well-defined attributes and does it provide security and assurance? As in a music performance, smart 
European policy on migration and integration is not just about technical expertise but about the whole 
sensorial experience.
Further reading
Mendoza, Cristóbal, and Ricard Morén-Alegret. 2013. “Exploring Methods and Techniques for 
the Analysis of Senses of Place and Migration.” Progress in Human Geography 37 (6): 
762–85. doi:10.1177/0309132512473867.
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Scenario 1: Polarised Europe
Encourage return migration 
Intra-EU mobility should not benefit some countries at the expense of others that lose qualified 
workers. Instead of a “brain drain”, circular migration offers the chance of a “brain gain”, as 
sending countries benefit from the human capital that mobile workers have acquired during their 
time abroad. In order to encourage return migration, sending countries should enact policies that 
aim at maintaining mobile workers’ links with their home countries, seeking to foster a sense of 
transnational citizenship, while ultimately working to facilitating their return.
For example, policies designed to maintain links with the home state might include actions such 
as expanding the use of e-government tools and providing citizens living abroad with the right 
to vote in national elections; organising an institutional network among nationals abroad; and 
actively promoting native-language schooling within expatriate communities. Facilitation mea-
sures should include the dissemination of information on home-country job offers, living and 
working conditions (e.g., on websites focusing specifically on these issues); assistance and finan-
cial support for businesses created by returning mobile workers (e.g., through establishing a 
venture-capital fund); and financial incentives for selected labour-force categories such as medical 
professionals or researchers.
Finally, making circular migration work also requires a change of mindset among firms and 
employers in countries of origin. Policymakers should work with local employers to create a cor-
porate culture that values skills and qualifications acquired in other countries. Targeted measures 
for the successful reintegration of returnees into the local labour market (such as creating a formal 
means of recognising qualifications and knowledge acquired in the host country, or by providing 
specific counselling services) can help to avoid situations in which European work experience 
becomes a disadvantage rather than an asset for individual career development.
Foster a European fair deal on talent
In an economically polarised Europe, workers increasingly move from long-term crisis-stricken 
countries to those experiencing prolonged economic growth. In such a scenario, the free movement 
of labour accelerates talent imbalances in EU Member States and threatens to cement the economic 
prospects of Member States into two groups: those that are talent hubs and those that repel home-
grown talent. As it is typically the young and educated who move, countries with prolonged net tal-
ent deficits see the age structure of their workforce shift upwards. These countries find themselves 
trapped in a vicious cycle, repeatedly losing out on the investments they have made educating 
future members of their workforce. These individuals’ decision to leave and pay taxes in other 
Member States further compounds the economic woes of the home country. Yet as jobs are scarce 
in crisis-stricken countries, keeping talent at home is not a viable alternative to free movement.
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The European Union could introduce a mechanism that is able to compensate talent-sending 
countries for their investments. Such a “talent mobility stabiliser” would consist of a financial 
package administered at the EU level, designed to help EU Member States that contribute to the 
talent pools of their neighbours develop the human capital of their own national workforces and 
reduce domestic unemployment rates. Such a temporary mechanism would ease the negative con-
sequences of outward mobility in sending countries, while helping to counterbalance economic 
disparities between EU countries.
Promote and simplify the recognition of professional qualifications, as well as 
skills and competences acquired through non-formal and informal learning 
According to national laws or regulations, the practice of certain professions (e.g., architects, 
engineers or physiotherapists) can be contingent upon having particular qualifications. Training 
requirements for obtaining such professional qualifications can differ from country to country 
and may thus make the exercise of a profession in another Member State quite difficult, or even 
impossible. The non-recognition of professional qualifications can therefore prevent workers from 
establishing themselves in another Member State, or lead to situations of wasted skill in which 
mobile citizens work in jobs below their actual level of qualification.
With Directive 2005/36/EC, which entered into force in 2007, the EU provided the first compre-
hensive reform of the system for the recognition of professional qualifications since this system’s 
introduction over 40 years ago. While a significant improvement, the current system automatically 
recognises qualifications in only seven out of 740 professions (e.g., doctors, dentists, pharmacists, 
veterinary surgeons, midwives, nurses and architects). Under the “general system” which applies 
to the large majority of regulated professions, the host country decides on a case-by-case basis 
and has a fair bit of discretion in terms of granting access to a given profession, a situation that 
creates legal uncertainty.
The recent update to the professional-qualification directive contains some important provisions 
that have the potential to speed up and simplify administrative procedures such as the European 
Professional Card, as well as common training frameworks allowing for automatic recognition. 
When transposing the directive (a process lasting until January 2016), Member States have to 
make sure that the reforms do not lead to an ever-more-complex system with separate rules for 
each profession, but should rather make best use of the new instruments to promote professional 
mobility across countries.
In addition to professional qualifications, the recognition of non-formal and informal learning 
– learning that takes place outside formal education institutions – can further facilitate a better 
match between skills and labour demand, while promoting mobility within the European labour 
market. Again, the work already done at the EU level and the recent Council recommendation 
on the validation of non-formal and informal learning represents an important step in the right 
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direction. By 2018, the recommendation obliges Member States to establish national systems for 
the validation of non-formal and informal learning that provide all citizens with an opportunity to 
undergo an audit of their skills and competences. Special care should be taken that the recognition 
procedures and practices are of high quality and are consistent throughout the European Union, 
so as to avoid providing misleading information about individual skills. In addition, the newly 
developed frameworks should focus on learning outcomes that are highly valued in the labour 
market.
Address integration needs of mobile workers and their families 
EU citizens who exercise their right to free movement are considered “mobile citizens” rather 
than “migrants”. As such, they are accorded a set of political and social rights which is nearly 
equivalent to the native population and find themselves in a strong position compared to third-
country nationals. However, their favourable status does not imply that the process of settling 
in and adapting to a new environment is easier for them than for those coming from outside the 
European Union. On the contrary, mobile citizens may have many of the same integration needs in 
terms of language and orientation as non-EU nationals. Yet mobile EU citizens and their families 
are not commonly targeted by national integration policies, and hence do not benefit from orienta-
tion and language programmes offered for non-nationals.
Without calling into question the principle of equal treatment, EU Member States should proac-
tively include mobile EU citizens in language and orientation courses on a voluntary basis. In 
particular, EU citizens – even if staying for only a limited period of time – should be able to benefit 
from support services in the first months of their stay, such as orientation programmes that 
provide information on administrative structures, employment rights and how to access key social 
services. A sufficient understanding of the host country’s language remains the most essential 
precondition for social and professional integration. At least basic language courses should be 
offered on a local level and be free of charge for mobile citizens and their families. In addition, 
firms and employers should be encouraged to provide language courses (including a professional 
component) to workers from other EU countries, through means such as organising and support-
ing regional networks of employers, chambers of commerce, educational institutions and other 
relevant stakeholders.
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The recognition of professional qualifications as a barrier to mobility
Katerina-Marina Kyrieri, European Institute of Public Administration
The mutual recognition of qualifications is a key element in establishing an efficient EU-wide labour 
market, but progress in this area has been slow. Training requirements for obtaining professional quali-
fications can differ from country to country and may, therefore, make the exercise of a profession in 
another Member State quite difficult, even impossible. A positive harmonisation approach would have 
to deal with the fact that plumbers’ skills and medical doctors’ qualifications are not as easily defined as 
a car’s safety and pollution characteristics. In addition, so long as Member States maintain unnecessary 
entry restrictions and employees’ or service providers’ soft skills, competencies and qualifications are 
not recognised in a fast, simple and reliable way by employers, market agencies, customers, or patients, 
disproportionate limitations and poor judgments can hinder labour mobility.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the European Commission began considering the alignment of educational 
provision and mutual recognition of qualifications as an important policy area for increasing mobility. 
Since then, a number of measures have been developed to facilitate the transparency and transferability 
of skills, qualifications and experience across the EU.
Most recently, the European Commission proposed a targeted modernisation of Directive 2005/36/EC on 
the recognition of professional qualifications. The need for simplification of the existing rules was clear, 
as at least 15% of all SOLVIT cases (the Commission’s framework to assist EU citizens and businesses in 
asserting their rights vis-à-vis a company or official body in a Member State) concern issues of profes-
sional qualifications. At the same time, the working-age population in many Member States is estimated 
to shrink by 6 million persons by 2020, while the demand for highly qualified workers continues to 
increase. The amending directive continues to offer three different routes on recognition whilst extending 
its scope to trainees and apprentices. A key feature is the introduction of a European Professional Card 
taking the form of an electronic certificate to allow an easier and quicker recognition of qualifications.
The directive also launches a proactive alert mechanism for health professions and professionals deal-
ing with children, but it does not explain how to address the differences in the disciplinary national 
systems (e.g., so-called black lists, persecutions, prohibitions, enhanced supervisions, investigations or 
courts’ decisions). The control of language knowledge is also reinforced for professions with patient 
safety implications. Nevertheless, it leaves margin of appreciation to the Member States’ competent 
authorities as how (e.g., language testing or evidence of language competencies) and when (before or 
after the registration) they will apply the linguistic obligations, thus making the access to the profession 
a two-step process. In addition, it remains to be seen who will carry out an a priori assessment of the 
suitability of the European Professional Card per country and profession as well as how costs/fees will 
be evaluated in relation to administrative procedures, as these need to be reasonable, proportionate and 
commensurate with the costs incurred by the home and host Member State.
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Scenario 2: Marketised Europe
Invest in training and up-skilling of mobile workers
In a pan-European labour market with a single European workforce, the European Union must 
take responsibility for the development of workers’ skills and human capital. As an increasing 
number of workers will work outside the countries where they have been educated and trained, 
Member States will be less interested in investing in these areas. Medium- and low-skilled highly 
mobile workers also tend to fall through the cracks of national skills-development policies. These 
workers who are dislocated by increased competition and technological change will have to be 
supported in transitioning into new jobs. The highly skilled, who are able to invest in their own 
human-capital development, will likely require less assistance.
The reformed European Social Fund (ESF) under the Multi-Annual Financial Framework 2014 – 
2020 can be a key instrument in developing a framework for skills development and retraining in 
the context of mobility. Among its four thematic objectives, the ESF funds measures for “promoting 
employment and supporting labour mobility” as well as “investing in education, skills and lifelong 
learning”. These objectives have to be interlinked, as education and training are crucial in helping 
individual workers and job seekers to move to new jobs and new countries. In addition, a stronger 
focus on people in difficulty and disadvantaged groups is necessary, since they are generally the 
ones most affected by increased competition and technological change. The European Commission 
as well as Member States have to make sure that the mobility dimension of ESF measures is suf-
ficiently reflected in the operational programmes based on the new regulation.
Invest in infrastructure projects for mobility
Cross-border commuting and short-term forms of mobility, in which workers habitually live in one 
country while working in another, tend to be preferable to more permanent forms of migration. 
Commuting does not involve the upheaval of moving away from home, leaving behind family, 
friends and existing support networks. Commuting also tends to impose less pressure on public 
services in destination countries (schools, health care, integration services, etc.).
However, to be viable, commuting requires an efficient and affordable transportation system. This 
means that the European Union should increase its investment in the European high-speed rail 
network. A real European railway rather than a collection of national railways would allow more 
passengers to travel over medium to long distances across national borders and thereby boost 
labour mobility. For shorter distances, regional public transportation systems along the borders 
should be integrated, thus allowing for efficient, punctual and cheap transportation across borders 
for daily commuters. For this to become reality, cross-border cooperation needs to be improved in 
order to get rid of red tape. In addition, more investment by Member States in the broadband inter-
net infrastructure would further facilitate commuting, as remote-work solutions reduce the need 
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to travel to the workplace on a daily basis. Instead, so-called telecommuters can work from home 
at least part of the time, making it easier to combine private life with a job in a different country.
Develop an EU-wide minimum-wage and working-conditions policy
In a marketised Europe, Member States will necessarily be less and less able or willing to regulate 
their labour markets on a national basis. Heightened competition and increased flexibility are 
likely to put pressure on wages and working conditions, while reducing trade unions’ ability to 
organise workers and bargain for higher wages. In addition, high labour mobility increases the 
importance of having mechanisms to ensure that minimum-wage standards provide protection 
for mobile workers and posted workers, groups often not covered by collective-bargaining agree-
ments. Common rules on minimum wages and working conditions not only prevent social dump-
ing and cutthroat competition, but are also vital in protecting mobile workers from exploitation. 
Of course, this cannot be done by setting one uniform minimum wage for the whole European 
Union. Rather, minimum wages have to be adapted to local wages and prices in order to accom-
modate productivity differentials between countries. One sensible rule could be that the national 
minimum wage should not be lower than a certain percentage of the national median wage (e.g., 
60%). The EU could also establish common rules on how to set national-level minimum wages and 
monitor the impact through the open method of coordination. While such policies might reduce 
mobility at first, they would nevertheless help to increase overall popular support for open labour 
markets. 
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Migration, mobility and accessibility
Vassilis Monastiriotis, European Institute, London School of Economics
Labour mobility is an important ingredient for well-functioning labour markets. It helps address skill and 
labour shortages in booming areas, ease employment pressures in depressed areas, and makes invest-
ment in skills and education more rewarding for workers. But mobility is also costly for the individual and 
thus rather “sticky”. This has two implications. First, mobility in the form of international migration, as in 
the European context, responds slowly to differences in economic opportunity and adjusts only partially 
when economic circumstances reverse. Second, it is often need-driven rather than opportunity-led, and 
thus linked to downward pressures in pay and working standards for both migrants and local workers. 
We can see this clearly in today’s context. South-to-north migration has indeed risen with the crisis, but 
only after record unemployment levels decimated large parts of the south; while in the north, migration 
flows have impelled scepticism towards deeper European integration. Traditionally, labour mobility in 
Europe has taken the form of permanent and unidirectional migration moves, typically from the less-
developed south to the north. More recently, however, Europe is increasingly seeing a different type of 
migration, which is speedier, more transitory and more circular. The return- and repeat-migration moves 
of Polish citizens in the United Kingdom or of Romanians in Spain are a visible part of this and come 
to add to patterns of relocation that were in the past limited to the west (north-north migration). But 
Europe is also seeing a rise in mobility in the form of long-distance commuting, not exclusively by high-
skilled professionals, which has started to replace (and sometimes to complement) more permanent 
migration moves. 
Institutional approximation (Single Market) and the opening up of borders (Schengen) have clearly 
played a vital role in this. But the single most-important factor has been the opening up of cheap 
and accessible routes (low-cost flights, high-speed rail, and better serviced road networks) that have 
effectively shortened the distance across Europe. Importantly, this has allowed migrants to maintain 
ties with their origin countries so that, once the “push” conditions are reversed, many return to settle 
back home, exploiting the financial and human capital they acquired while abroad. In a way, enhanced 
accessibility alters the meaning and nature of migration in Europe, bringing it closer to the abstract 
notion of (labour) mobility. 
In the context of today’s pressures for north-south adjustment, this brings a powerful message. To 
harness mobility in Europe, to make it less costly and essentially less “sticky”, it is imperative to invest 
further in accessibility and effective proximity. Other impediments will of course remain: linguistic and 
cultural barriers, problems of portability of accumulated rights, even barriers related to employment 
regulation. But even if these are addressed, without enhanced accessibility mobility will remain less 
circular and less responsive to economic asymmetries; it will remain need-based and unidirectional 
rather than dynamic and opportunity-driven. 
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Scenario 3: Regulated Europe
Improve EU-wide job matching
In order for the European labour market to work efficiently, institutions that match supply and 
demand for labour and skills across countries will need to be significantly improved. Public 
employment services and the EURES European job mobility network can play an important role in 
this respect. Ideally, the job search and recruitment processes should be as simple and thorough 
at the EU level as at the national level.
Public employment services (PES) should be the first point of reference for any citizen looking for 
work in another country. Workers and their partners should have quick access to job openings 
and skills-upgrade opportunities prior to or following their move, and should be provided with 
a means to have their existing skills recognised. National employment agencies in the country 
of destination could provide personalised career guidance for mobile workers, especially upon 
arrival, including information on working and living conditions and administrative procedures. 
This would improve the ability to match workers’ skill sets to employment opportunities across 
the European Union.
However, if the full potential of these programmes is to be reached, EURES has to be considerably 
strengthened and developed further. While the EURES operational reform of 2012 represents a 
step in the right direction, further reforms are necessary. A reinforced EURES network should in 
particular aim at:
 Increasing its scope by including all nationally registered job offers in the EURES database.
 Mainstreaming its activities into the day-to-day business of national PES organisations, for 
example by making EURES a major component of all national job-agency websites and job-
search services.
 Offering additional high-quality services for mobile workers, with a focus on matching, place-
ment and recruitment.
 Making the EURES web portal more accessible and user friendly for job seekers, as well as 
more attractive to employers by allowing them to upload company profiles in addition to spe-
cific job offers.
 Complete and simplify the coordination of social-security systems for EU citizens 
Since the establishment of the regime allowing free movement of persons, the European Union has 
invested a great deal of effort in the coordination of social-security systems, creating an intricate 
legal framework that ensures persons moving within the EU do not suffer disadvantages in their 
social-security rights. Despite the important legal acquis in this area, certain gaps remain that 
must be closed in a timely manner. In particular, this concerns the coordination of unemployment 
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and long-term care benefits, as well as the portability of supplementary pension rights. With 
regard to the revision of the coordination of unemployment benefits, special care has to be taken 
that unemployed mobile workers receive benefits that reflect contributions to insurance schemes 
made in other EU countries. In addition, as a general rule, unemployed workers who wish to seek 
a job abroad should be able to export their unemployment benefits for a period of up to six months. 
A longer job-search period would allow workers to look for better jobs, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of job matching.
Furthermore, social-security coordination has to be made more transparent and accessible for the 
individual citizen. The complexity of the current system and the lack of information provided to 
citizens create uncertainty that prevents people from moving. Apart from the simplification of the 
legal framework and a reduction of administrative burdens, the European Union should make social-
security coordination more visible. This could be achieved by introducing a European social-security 
card and a European social-security number, following the successful example of the European 
health-insurance card. This number would provide citizens with a European administrative identity 
and assure them that all their social-security contributions, regardless of the country where they 
are paid, are being accounted for. In addition, a hotline for one-stop advice on social-security rights 
for those seeking information or reporting an abuse of their rights should be created. This hotline 
should also provide callers with information on legal means of recovering their rights.
Support mobility-oriented mindsets 
Apart from institutional and economic factors, EU citizens’ decisions to migrate depend on indi-
vidual preferences and expectations regarding the costs and opportunities of living and working 
in another country. In many Member States, the propensity of people to move is traditionally very 
low, and looking for work abroad is not commonly considered desirable.
While this inertia is often attributed to cultural factors, policies can play an important role by intro-
ducing a “mobility mindset” among Europeans at a young age. The provision of high-quality lan-
guage lessons in secondary and vocational education settings, cultural programmes, and exchange 
programmes for students of all ages and levels makes it more likely that young people will develop 
a positive attitude towards mobility. Hence, these experiences should be made available to as many 
youth as possible. Opportunities for “learning mobility” and for gaining exposure to other cultures 
and languages via study, training or work opportunities are made available by EU programmes such 
as Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci, Comenius (now combined under the new Erasmus+ programme), 
the “Your First EURES Job” programme, and the European Voluntary Service. The European Union 
must continue to fund these programmes sufficiently in order to allow as many young people as 
possible to acquire experience with intra-EU mobility. While the immediate gains behind these 
measures are not always evident, in particular during times of political and economic crises, their 
long-term benefits for EU integration and identity should not be underestimated.
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Mobility of students and researchers: Erasmus as a role model for EU mobil-
ity policies
Nannette Ripmeester, Expertise in Labour Mobility (ELM)
Regardless of what was anticipated in 1957 when the European Economic Community established in 
Article 45 the principles of freedom of labour, in 2012 only 6.5 million EU citizens have exercised their 
right and were working in another EU Member State. With the new Erasmus+ programme that aims 
to boost skills and employability over the next seven years, this situation should improve considerably.
The Erasmus+ programme received a 40% budget increase for a total of €14.7 billion to underline the 
EU’s commitment to invest in study and training opportunities in other EU Member States. The reason 
behind this substantial increase is two-fold. The earlier Erasmus programme proved that people who had 
the opportunity to study abroad were more inclined to be mobile later in life. Moreover, it turns out that a 
period abroad also makes people more culturally sensitive and aware that what may work in one country 
is not a standard recipe for success in others – an understanding much appreciated in working life.
The fact that nearly 6 million young people are unemployed in the EU while 40% of European employers 
report difficulties in finding skilled workers is rather alarming. The new Erasmus+ programme will not 
be a panacea, but it is definitely a step in the right direction. Providing EU citizens with an opportunity 
to meet other fellow EU citizens during a study exchange will support an openness that is essential 
for the European project to succeed. Each Erasmus student will be able to tell you a story about the 
challenges they encountered with regard to communication. In addition to the difficulties of speaking a 
different language, they will all relate to cultural differences, in particular the diverse ways of interpreting 
something that one may have always thought straightforward. Imagine how students communicate with 
academic staff: on a first-name basis or by academic title? Picture work with a diverse group of stu-
dents: striving for consensus before starting on a research project or going with the idea that is offered 
most convincingly. The ability to work in teams, developing strong communication skills, cultivating 
cultural sensitivity, flexibility and diplomacy, just to name a few, are also developed during a study period 
abroad. And these are exactly the skills companies mention when asking what they look for in prospec-
tive employees. The possibility that Erasmus+ offers our young people – school children, older students, 
young entrepreneurs and researchers – is a golden ticket to better-equipped European workers.
If Europe in 2020 wants to succeed in be(com)ing a strong economic power, respected for its com-
petitiveness, its economic growth and its strong labour market, we need more mobility for EU citizens 
to reach these education and employment goals. We cannot waste Europe’s talent; instead we need 
to grow and sustain that talent, and supporting mobility for students and researchers is a model for 
European success.
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Reforming EURES – what’s in it for employers?
Ulrike Klein, Austrian Federal Economic Chamber
The basic idea is quite simple. As the European Vacancy Monitor of February 2014 (DG Employment 
2014) has shown, many people are unemployed in some European countries while companies suffer 
from skill shortages in other European countries. Youth unemployment rates in Spain and Greece are 
above 50%, for example, while Austrian employers lack workers in mainly technical fields. 
So let’s fill the gaps and bring together the unemployed and job vacancies for the benefit of all. EURES, 
the European Job Mobility Portal – together with other European Commission initiatives – should help 
make this a reality. Until now, however, EURES has not been working well enough. This article will briefly 
set out the key issues for Austrian employers as part of the ongoing EURES reform process. 
First of all, EURES has to be made more attractive for both job seekers and companies. The Austrian 
Federal Economic Chamber appreciates that the matching of vacancies and job seekers will be the core 
of EURES, instead of concentrating on just providing information. 
A Europe-wide pool of vacancies definitely makes more sense, if as many vacancies as possible are 
fed into it. So far, some labour market services do not post vacancies to the site. In other Member 
States – such as Austria – all vacancies are posted online automatically. Naturally, this situation requires 
a well-functioning and efficient public employment service that is equipped with sufficient resources.
It is often claimed that before relocating to another country for work, an individual should speak the 
country’s language.Basic knowledge of a new language is certainly useful when moving abroad. How-
ever, given the different language families in the EU, it is not realistic to expect people to speak a 
new language perfectly before their move. The Austrian Federal Economic Chamber therefore has been 
asking throughout the reform process for an automatic translation tool on EURES. Even a link to an 
automated translation system would be better than nothing, to ensure that a candidate can get an 
overview of the labour market of the “new country”.
One important part (though not yet technically started) of EURES reform is a pilot project called, “Your 
First EURES Job”. This mobility scheme gives targeted financial support to both the unemployed and 
to companies. Funds can be applied for example to cover travel costs for an interview or for language 
courses. Employers can ask for support for internal training programmes that are adapted to the needs 
of the new employee. Since money is another obstacle for moving within the EU, from an employers’ 
perspective, this programme could be a valuable contribution to labour mobility within the EU.
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Scenario 4: Fragmented Europe
Help localities deal with social burdens created by mobility 
Increased mobility can lead to new challenges regarding social inclusion in cities as well as dis-
advantaged and rural areas. These can place a particular strain on local public services such as 
health care, education and housing. The inflow of large numbers of newcomers to certain cities 
may lead to difficulties in planning these services, as well as to disproportionate financial burdens 
related to the need for more hospital beds, teachers, housing and other such resources. Mobile 
EU citizens may also arrive in villages and rural areas that lack experience with immigration, 
leading to increased diversity and related challenges within these local communities (e.g., more 
second-language pupils in need of additional support). Finally, mobile EU citizens tend to settle in 
underprivileged neighbourhoods already characterised by various social problems such as over-
crowding, poor-quality housing and high rates of crime.
On the other hand, the outflow of workers from declining regions and cities in sending countries 
also leads to problems, such as shrinking cities and rural-area depopulation. In general, emi-
gration tends to reinforce regional disparities within countries and often amplifies unfavourable 
demographic trends, threatening the financial sustainability of social services. In helping locali-
ties to deal with these burdens, it is foremost the responsibility of individual Member States to 
promote urban and rural development and provide compensation for heavily burdened regions. 
Nonetheless, EU social and cohesion policy should pay more attention to addressing the uneven 
territorial effects of increased mobility. A dedicated European mobility fund could support local 
authorities in providing appropriate reception and housing facilities, thus facilitating manage-
ment of the inflow of mobile EU workers.
In addition, other financial mechanisms intended for social inclusion and integration such as the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Integration Fund should be targeted to a greater 
extent to the inclusion of mobile EU citizens in host societies as well as to supporting those left 
behind in sending countries, such as children and the elderly.
 Promote free movement and oppose nationalism by emphasising the benefits 
of mobility 
Intra-EU labour mobility is viewed as a problem rather than as a solution in the public discourse. 
While the negative side effects of increased mobility should be addressed, the benefits of mobility 
for the European Union as a whole as well as for its Member States and citizens are overwhelming. 
It is the responsibility of politicians at the national and European level not to exploit mobility for 
populist purposes, but to emphasise its potential in tackling some of our most pressing problems, 
from demographic change to sluggish growth and high unemployment in some Member States.
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The European Union can support a more positive image of labour mobility by conducting further 
research on the size and effects of mobility and by communicating the findings to the European 
public. Improved evidence and monitoring on mobility, such as a system of benchmarks and indi-
cators, would not only improve our understanding of evolving mobility trends, but also help indi-
viduals to make better migration decisions and offset mobility lags. The European Union should 
also actively seek to engage national authorities, trade unions, employer organisations and other 
stakeholders on all levels to promote labour mobility.
Make national labour markets more flexible and fight discrimination based on 
citizenship 
National policies that improve labour-market flexibility and reduce segmentation make it easier 
for migrants to enter a foreign labour market successfully. In dual labour markets characterised 
by stable employment, high levels of protection and good working conditions for insiders, but 
which also offer insecure and temporary employment for groups outside the core labour force, 
migrants, including mobile EU citizens, will be overrepresented among the outsiders. Policies 
that improve flexibility, such as reducing employment protections, also act to diminish direct or 
indirect discrimination and serve as functional equivalents to more deliberate mobility-enhancing 
policies. For example, in labour markets with low employment protection or extensive probation 
periods for new contracts, employers can test migrants’ actual skills and qualifications on the job, 
reducing the need for a harmonisation of formal qualifications and training standards. Increased 
flexibility does not necessarily imply a diminution of workers’ rights if it is combined with active 
labour-market integration measures and high levels of income security in cases of unemployment, 
as demonstrated in the Danish “flexicurity” model.
Policies seeking to reduce labour-market segmentation must be complemented by strengthening 
mobile EU citizens’ ability to exercise their free-movement rights, particularly regarding equal 
treatment within host countries’ labour markets. Currently, although the regulation on free move-
ment mandates non-discrimination when it comes to employment and working conditions, remu-
neration, and dismissal, mobile workers too often face discrimination by employers and national 
authorities that fail to comply with EU law. In addition, EU citizens do not have sufficient infor-
mation about their rights, and lack effective instruments for enforcing those rights. In order to 
secure the discrimination-free access of all EU citizens to domestic labour markets, the European 
Union must show greater commitment to enforcing the freedom of movement for workers. The 
current Commission proposal for a directive on enforcing the freedom of movement for workers 
(COM(2013) 236) is hence an important addition to existing EU law. However, given the insuf-
ficient ability to enforce the right of free movement at the national level, as well as the extensive 
scope for discretion allowed by the directive, the proposed provisions should be inserted directly 
into the free-movement regulation.
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BUSINESSEUROPE’s views on labour mobility
Robert Plummer, BUSINESSEUROPE
Labour mobility within the EU is important from an economic and social perspective. It brings a positive 
contribution to the successful functioning of the European Single Market and Member States’ individual 
economies. The free movement of workers can also improve the way in which European labour markets 
function by ensuring the right conditions for people to move around for jobs within enterprises as well as 
across occupations, enterprises, sectors and geographically without borders. By doing so, mobility helps 
to address mismatches between labour supply and employer demand, for which there is an established 
trend at the EU level. 
The context for employer demand for labour is largely provided by projected changes to Europe’s demo-
graphic make-up over the coming decades. This will see the retirement of the post-war baby boomers and 
an anticipated need to replace 75 million workers by 2020. There are also issues associated with the need 
to overcome skills mismatches in the EU. Policies are therefore needed that will encourage labour mobility 
and mitigate or dismantle the existing barriers to it. This mobility is to be seen as part of the EU’s wider 
policy mix for enhancing productivity and competitiveness, rather than being treated as the silver bullet. 
Labour market mobility policies must be accompanied by national labour market reforms as well as a focus 
on improving learning outcomes as part of education and training in order to address the EU’s skills needs. 
BUSINESSEUROPE highlights the following key points:
 Mobile workers are a vital resource in a number of sectors across the EU where they complement the 
indigenous workforce. This involves sectors such as tourism and leisure, agriculture and health care. 
 Mobile workers contribute new ideas and a fresh way of thinking that can drive economic growth 
and innovation. 
 A flexible, demand-driven approach towards labour mobility is needed. 
Bearing in mind the different legal status of EU citizens vi-à-vis third country nationals, BUSINESSEU-
ROPE has identified the following recommendations for targeted actions that would help stimulate 
labour mobility within the EU: 
 Country-specific recommendations could be issued on language learning in schools so that pupils have 
the opportunity to learn at least one other EU language before they reach the school-leaving age. 
 Develop simplified and time-efficient procedures for the recognition of qualifications. This should 
involve a common approach to ensuring certain quality levels for education and training across the 
Member States.
 Member States should regularly review the extent to which a profession needs to remain regulated. 
 Supplementary pension entitlements accrued across borders within the EU must be preserved. 
 EU citizens should be provided better information and appropriate support and advice services.
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Scenario 5: Paralysed Europe
 Sustain support for free movement by limiting opportunities for fraud and 
abuse 
In order to counter concerns about “welfare migration” and “benefits tourism” and sustain popular 
support for the right to free movement, the European Union should improve the clarity and fair-
ness of the rules governing social-security coordination. This concerns in particular the entitle-
ments to residency-based, non-contributory benefits such as means-tested social assistance, as 
well as universal benefits such as support for children. In the case of non-contributory benefits, 
granting access to newcomers who have not yet paid into the public purse is regarded as particu-
larly unfair, a sentiment that is likely to strengthen in times of austerity and large-scale cuts to 
welfare programmes. The current situation, in which benefit entitlements are determined on a 
case-by-case basis by national courts, is characterised by high legal uncertainty. This is not only 
to the detriment of mobile citizens, but also fuels ongoing public debates.
 
One option would be to extend the minimum length of residence during which a Member State 
has no obligation to grant social assistance to economically non-active EU citizens (currently three 
months). The EU should also clarify the rules and procedures on deportation, and make “assisted 
return” a viable option for those mobile citizens who do not succeed in a destination country’s 
labour market. Apart from employment coaching and information on opportunities elsewhere, 
such a return package could also include support for travel and moving costs.
 
Target financial support at least-mobile groups
The EU should extend the Erasmus idea – that is, mobility schemes that provide financial support 
– beyond students to individuals who have already established a career. The lower the qualifica-
tion level, the lower individuals’ geographical labour mobility tends to be. Low labour mobility 
among less-skilled workers can be a rational choice because the prospective gains of increased 
income can be insufficient to outweigh the immediate losses incurred by leaving established social 
networks that compensate for low income.
 
Providing less-skilled workers with pecuniary incentives to become mobile can therefore be 
especially effective in increasing labour mobility. In practice, such measures can be implemented 
within the framework of Member States’ active labour market policies and, for example, consist of 
time-limited wage subsidies for needy job-seekers who take up employment in another country.
 
Support initiatives to foster mobility at a regional and bilateral level 
In light of growing labour and skill shortages in some European regions, a plethora of initiatives for 
the recruitment of foreign workers has emerged. Programmes and projects by cities, employers’ 
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organisations such as local chambers of commerce, and public authorities help employers, in 
particular SMEs, to recruit workers from abroad. Often, these initiatives provide language classes 
for incoming workers, offer assistance with administrative procedures, and provide contacts to 
the dispatching countries’ labour markets. Other initiatives, such as bilateral agreements for the 
recruitment of health care professionals, target certain sectors. These initiatives are often quite 
successful, but also remain limited in size and reach. Member States should consider reinforcing 
these regional networks and supporting them in the construction of sustainable structures. The 
EU’s role could be to provide a pan-European platform for networking and sharing best practices 
in the area of cross-border recruitment processes. In this way, successful models could be brought 
to light and transferred to other countries and sectors.
Building blocks of a Single European Labour Market
Hélène Syed, Confrontations Europe
Since the beginning of European integration in 1957, the free movement of workers has been a source 
of heated controversy. The role of labour mobility is in fact two-sided, as while it theoretically improves 
the functioning of the euro area, it also disrupts the systems of industrial relations constructed histori-
cally at the national level. In this time of crisis, competitiveness differentials require the organisation 
of a system of transnational mobility in employment and training that is related to the production and 
industrial needs of European countries.
Today there is no European labour market which facilitates a European citizen’s professional and geo-
graphical transition. But concerted European action can be decisive at an institutional level. The EU can 
initiate the establishment of a European market, based on the three pillars which are fundamental to 
any economic definition of a labour market. The first pillar refers to a system of qualification recognition 
and training; at a European level, such a system is underdeveloped and needs to be complemented, for 
example, by European curricula. The second pillar refers to transparent, accessible and free information 
about labour market conditions (job offers, vacancies, wages and so on) at a European level; this could 
be offered by a public employment service on the basis of genuine reform as part of the European 
Job Mobility Portal (EURES). Finally, the third pillar refers to a continuity of social and fiscal rights; an 
expanded transnational portability of rights would be welcomed at the European level.
Let’s not forget third-country nationals who have yet no right of immediate mobility within European 
national labour markets. These individuals respond quickly to differences in competitiveness at a 
national level, including discrepancies in wages and unemployment rates. Their sensitivity to these dif-
ferences can contribute substantially to intra-European mobility.. In this regard, closer coordination of 
European immigration policy, labour market policy and intra-EU mobility policy would be welcome (first 
and foremost, for EU Blue Cards).
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During the final workshop, the HELM advisory board stress-tested the policy recommendations 
according to the threats and opportunities posed by the scenarios. Each policy recommendation 
was assessed as to whether it was core, supporting or counterproductive in each possible future. 
 Core: Core policy recommendations are those that were considered key to promoting labour-
market mobility in a given scenario, both in terms of objective and possible impact.
 Supporting: Supporting policy recommendations are those that were identified as having 
secondary importance, but which could help to improve labour-market mobility in a given sce-
nario.
 Counterproductive: Counterproductive policy recommendations are those that were identi-
fied as having no effect or even a limiting effect on labour-market mobility in a given scenario.
Depending on the scenario, a policy recommendation could be core, supporting or counterproduc-
tive. Figure 14 shows the results of the stress-testing exercise.
Based on the results of the stress-testing, policy recommendations were grouped into three cat-
egories according to their degree of effectiveness in and applicability across all scenarios. Five 
policy recommendations were deemed “essential”, meaning that they were core policy recommen-
dations in almost all scenarios and were not counterproductive in any single scenario. These were 
the strongest and most robust proposals, as they functioned across all possible futures. Hence, any 
action to increase labour mobility should prioritise reforms in these areas. 
An additional seven items were considered to be “additional” policy proposals, as they were able 
to support labour mobility in any given scenario, but would most likely not be very effective in 
increasing labour mobility on their own. However, these policies could have added benefit in an 
appropriate policy mix, and should be part of any long-term strategy seeking to enhance labour 
mobility.
Finally, three scenario-dependent policy recommendations were identified. These policies were 
valuable in specific scenarios, but might pose problems under changed circumstances. For exam-
ple, whereas a European minimum wage policy could be appropriate in a Marketised Europe 
scenario in order to avoid social dumping and exploitation, the same policy might be problematic 
in situations where regulatory burdens were already high and labour markets inflexible, as in 
the Paralysed Europe scenario. In the same vein, regional and bilateral initiatives for increasing 
labour mobility could be an effective tool in the absence of EU-wide cooperation. However, if effec-
tive common EU institutions were in place, they could lead to unnecessary duplication and higher 
transaction costs. Hence, these policies should be enacted with care, and if implemented should 
be evaluated periodically to ensure they are consonant with the changing social and political 
environment for European labour-market mobility.  
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Table 9:  Stress-tested policy recommendations
 
Polarised 
Europe
Marketised 
Europe
Regulated 
Europe
Fragmented 
Europe
Paralysed 
Europe
Policy recommendations based on Polarised Europe
Encourage return migration
Foster a European fair deal on talent 
Promote and simplify the recognition of professional qualifications as well as skills 
and competences acquired through non-formal and informal learning
Address the integration needs of mobile workers and their families
Policy recommendations based on Marketised Europe
Invest in training and up-skilling of mobile workers
Invest in infrastructure projects for mobility
Develop an EU-wide minimum-wage and working-conditions policy
Policy recommendations based on Regulated Europe
Improve EU-wide job matching
 Complete and simplify coordination of social-security systems for EU citizens
Support mobility-oriented mindsets
Policy recommendations based on Fragmented Europe
Help localities deal with the social burdens created by mobility 
Promote free movement and oppose nationalism by emphasising the benefits of 
mobility
Make national labour markets more flexible and fight discrimination based on 
citizenship
Policy recommendations based on Paralysed Europe
Sustain support for free movement by limiting opportunities for fraud and abuse 
Target financial support at least-mobile groups
Support initiatives to foster mobility at a regional and bilateral level
 Core policy recommendation        Supportive policy recommendation       Counterproductive policy recommendation 
Source: By authors.
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In conclusion, a number of cross-cutting themes and issues for fostering labour mobility can be 
identified that deserve emphasis:
The importance of language training
The linguistic variety of languages in the EU certainly represents one of the main hurdles for 
cross-border mobility. Unlike the United States, moving across the linguistic borders of Europe 
requires considerable additional efforts and creates higher costs that do not exist in a uniform 
language area. Yet, the cultural value of Europe’s many languages should not be pitted against 
economic considerations. Instead of striving for a single language, and thereby losing much of 
the cultural diversity and creativity characterising Europe, the EU should continue to foster the 
idea of multilingualism. Beginning at a young age and throughout their entire school career, chil-
dren should learn at least two other languages in addition to their mother tongue, and perhaps 
Essential policy recommendations 
 Encourage return migration
 Invest in training and up-skilling of mobile workers
 Improve EU-wide job matching
 Complete and simplify the coordination of social-security systems for EU citizens
 Promote free movement and oppose nationalism by emphasising the benefits of mobility
Additional policy recommendations 
 Foster a fair deal on European talent
 Promote and simplify the recognition of professional qualifications as well as skills and competences 
acquired through non-formal and informal learning
 Address the integration needs of mobile workers and their families
 Invest in infrastructure projects for mobility
 Support mobility-oriented mindsets
 Help localities deal with social burdens created by mobility
 Make national labour markets more flexible and fight discrimination based on citizenship 
 Target financial support at least-mobile groups
Scenario-dependent policy recommendations
 Develop an EU-wide minimum-wage and working-conditions policy 
 Sustain support for free movement by limiting opportunities for fraud and abuse
 Support initiatives to foster mobility at a regional and bilateral level
HELM policy recommendations compared
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understand something of a few others. The instruction in and learning of foreign languages in 
Europe is not to be confined to English only. While learning languages does not become easier 
with age, lifelong learning should also comprise the learning of languages, which is of course 
especially relevant for mobile citizens.
The completion of the Single Market
Despite the considerable achievements in the integration of European markets for goods, capital, 
services and labour, the Single Market is not yet complete. Important gaps remain in some areas, 
such as finance and banking. In others, administrative obstacles and lacking enforcement of exist-
ing regulations hamper its functioning. In particlar, mobile citizens are not only affected by the 
regulations on the freedom of movement of workers. They are also dependent on complementary 
areas of the Single Market if, for example, they want to open a bank account or rent real estate 
in another Member State. In the same vein, a fully integrated transport system is vital for labour 
mobility to function well in practice. For this reason, efforts to further develop the Single Market 
for goods, services and capital have the potential to boost labour mobility and should have high 
priority.
The potential of circular migration
Already today, mobility flows in the EU are becoming increasingly complex with traditional 
long-term relocation being complemented by shorter and more transitory forms of mobility. This 
development towards a more circular and dynamic mobility pattern is to be welcomed. First, it 
expedites intra-EU mobility and makes it more responsive to asymmetric shocks thereby increas-
ing its potential to act as an adjustment mechanism in times of crisis. Second, it allows mobile 
workers to maintain their ties with their country of origin, creating new linkages and economic 
opportunities. Finally, it makes a “brain drain” in sending countries less likely and even allows for 
“brain gain” through the increased circulation of knowledge and skills. 
However, in order to realise the potential of circular mobility, policies and institutions have to 
be adapated to this new reality. For example, in many countries registration procedures such as 
check-in and check-out requirements are time-consuming and not geared towards repeated reloca-
tions. Also, Member States will have to find new models for the “transitory integration” of mobile 
citizens. While providing orientation and information regarding, for example, working rights and 
access to social services, such policies cannot any more presuppose long-term membership of or 
even naturalisation in the host society. Finally, countries of origin should enact measures to make 
sure that returning mobile citizens are smoothly re-integrated into the domestic labour market.
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The importance of a mobility-friendly culture
While being mobile is first and foremost an individual choice, often prompted by a complex set 
of economic, social and personal motivations, cultural attitudes towards migration are important 
factors shaping the environment in which these decision are taken. Both in the countries of origin 
and destination, negative attitudes against foreigners or perceptions of migration and return as 
“failure” make mobility a much less attractive option. Hence, the promotion of a mobility-friendly 
culture, while difficult to achieve by political means, remains important. Such a mobility-friendly 
culture includes an increased cultural awareness among employers, consumers and co-workers 
for the particular challenges of adjusting to life in another country. Also, public authorities on the 
regional and local level can play their role by practising a “culture of welcome” in offices, schools 
and elsewhere. Finally, promoting tolerance, diversity and openness towards other cultures is a 
key role of actors in civil society, from trade unions in the workplace, to sports clubs and other 
associations.
HELM policy recommendations compared
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Table 10: List of uncertainties and polarities for European labour mobility
 
Strategic Theme / Grouping Polarity A Uncertainty Polarity B
1. Transforming power structures
1.1. Changes in power structures Networks Social structures Institutions
1.2. Role of labour-market partners Inclusive Labour-market partners Exclusive
1.3. Cooperation among social partners Fragmentation Social partners Coordination
1.4. Urbanisation Cities/Regions Loci of power Countries
1.5. Changes in life patterns Bedrock Role of traditional social institutions I choose to be on my own
1.6.  Cooperation among others  
(local, regional actors, EURES 
advisers, CSOs, communities)
Fragmentation Roles to be played Lack of coordination
1.7. Future of the EU project Dissolution Future of the EU Further integration and enlargement
1.8. Migration policy Conservative migration policies Shifting political preferences Liberal migration policies
1.9. Demand for labour Demand for local labour Changing labour-market needs (care 
sector in particular)
Demand for migrant labour
1.10. Demographic changes New population boom Demographics Ageing / depopulation
2. Boundaries dissolving
2.1. EU cooperation Deepening EU member countries Fragmentation
2.2. Further rounds of enlargement Expansion EU enlargement Consolidation
2.3. Decreasing number of EU members “Slam the door” EU break-up “Leave as friends”
2.4. Process of EU integration United States of Europe Sovereignty Club of nation-states
2.5. Recognition of qualifications European Standards National
2.6. EU citizenship as identity European Identity National
2.7. Integrated social security system European Pensions, health care and 
unemployment insurance
National
2.8. Basic income security Host-country-based Social support Source-country-based
2.9. Labour-market regulation High degree of coordination Labour-market coordination Low degree of regulation
2.10. Nationalism, racism and xenophobia Marginal Prominence Loud
2.11. Integrated fiscal system European Fiscal /tax system National
2.12.  External relations in the near 
periphery of the EU
Modernisation / democratisation Relations with EU periphery Retrenchment / instability
3. Technological breakthrough
3.1. Globalisation Glocal Physical work location Global
3.2. High automation Displacement Obsolescence of labour Reintegration
3.3. Logistics and transportation Reduced Costs Increasing
3.4. Virtualisation of work High Virtualisation of work Low
3.5. Energy-source transformation Unsuccessful Socio-ecological transition Successful
3.6. Innovation capacity of the EU Fewer jobs Innovation capacity More jobs
3.7. Globalisation of value chains Increasing fragmentation Value chains More locally based value chains
 
Source: By authors.
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Annex
Table 10: List of uncertainties and polarities for European labour mobility (continued)
 
Strategic Theme / Grouping Polarity A Uncertainty Polarity B
3.8. Globalisation of labour markets Globalised and segmented Labour markets Labour markets are present in most 
occupations and at all levels
3.9. Relative position Smart growth / technology frontier Distance from global technology 
frontier
Routinisation / standardisation
3.10. Distance-learning teaching High Use distance-learning technologies Low
4. Economic prospects
4.1. Economic growth Stagnation Economic growth Return to growth
4.2. Economic inequalities Intra-EU divergence Per capita GDP (PPP) Intra-EU convergence
4.3. Euro zone Collapse Common market Euro zone holds
4.4. The economic model Plurality Economic model Convergence
4.5. Labour market Commodification Social policies Decommodification
4.6.  The EU compared to other markets 
(China, India, MENA)
Follower Europe’s position Leader
4.7. Skills appropriation Great mismatch Skills in EU Skills alignment
4.8. Outsourcing and offshoring Glocal Value networks Global
4.9.  Financial incentives from the state 
level
Lack of coordination of different 
state actors
Workability Measurement
4.10. EU funding Lack of information, communication Restructuring of policy areas Lack of understanding of EU 
regulations
4.11. Behavioural change of agents Self-focused/individualistic 
behaviour
Behavioural change Socially responsible economic 
behaviour of agents
4.12.  On-shoring / Re-shoring and  
co-location of activities
Sticky Economic diversity Non-adhesive
4.13. Industrial policy European Industrial strategy National
4.14. Economic / production structure Divergence Specialisation Convergence
4.15. Changing drivers of growth (Public) investment Sources of demand Financialisation
5. EU policies
5.1. Mobility within EU Rights-based approach Promotion of intra-EU mobility Economistic approach
5.2. Integration of policies “One-stop shop” Policies The maze
5.3.  Establishment of balancing 
mechanisms
Indirect steering Protectionism and boundaries Liberal migration
5.4. Transparency EU- and state-based Transparency Free market
5.5. Awareness Cross-border cooperation Awareness of possibilities Lack of information
5.6. Bureaucracy National Bureaucracy One social-security number
5.7.  Monitoring and evaluation  
(input and output indicators)
Insufficient results, not overview of 
good practices
Targets achieved, better methods 
and tools to be used
Lack of continuity
5.8. Impact assessments Limited use, lack of continuity Maintain database Political unwillingness
5.9. Languages No priority in EU policy Funds EU priority
5.10. The future of the European project Inter-governmentalism Political union Supranationalism
 
Source: By authors.
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